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Abstract
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows a data owner to outsource its data to a
cloud server while maintaining the ability to search over it. Most existing SSE schemes
leak access-pattern leakage, and thus are vulnerable to attacks like the IKK attack. Obliv-
ious RAM and PIR can be used to construct SSE schemes that fully hide access patterns.
However, such schemes suffer from heavy communication overhead or computation over-
head making them impractical. Chen et al. proposed an obfuscation mechanism to protect
existing SSE schemes against access-pattern leakage. This mechanism can produce differ-
entially private access patterns per keyword. However, it cannot hide whether or not the
same keyword is being searched multiple times or, in other words, the search patterns,
making this mechanism vulnerable to search-pattern attacks.
In this thesis, we propose a stronger security definition for differentially private search-
able symmetric encryption schemes and present a real construction, DP-SSE, fulfilling it.
On the one hand, DP-SSE is adaptively semantically secure and provides differential pri-
vacy for both keywords and documents implying search-pattern hiding and access-pattern
hiding, respectively. On the other hand, DP-SSE has communication overhead as small
as O(log log n) and computation complexity of O(n · log log n) when querying relatively
frequent keyword w. When assuming queries follow Zipfian distribution, the amortized
communication overhead would be O(log n · log log n). By replicating the IKK attack, we
show that DP-SSE can actually hide access patterns and make it difficult to extract useful
information from differentially private access-pattern leakage. Finally, we perform KMeans
clustering, we were able to show that inferring search patterns from differentially private
access-pattern leakage is difficult, namely search patterns are hidden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows a client to outsource its database to another
party (server) in a private way, while enabling the database to be searched by the client
without revealing the content of queries or documents. In a typical SSE scenario, the client
first locally produces an encrypted version of its database under one key, together with an
encrypted index with another key, to be outsourced to the server. Later, the client can
issue queries to search the outsourced encrypted index, and retrieve matched encrypted
results to be decrypted locally.
During the interaction, the server will learn which documents are accessed. This type
of leakage is known as access-pattern leakage. Most existing SSE schemes [8, 29, 17, 16, 3,
15, 2] allow such leakage for performance considerations. However, recent studies [14, 4, 32]
demonstrated that with some prior knowledge of the outsourced database, an honest-but-
curious server is able to recover the underlying keywords of queries with high accuracy.
One solution to hide access patterns is oblivious RAM (ORAM). An ORAM algorithm
allows a client to access remote documents without revealing which documents are accessed.
Such property is achieved by requiring clients to continuously shuﬄe and re-encrypt data as
they are accessed which involves high communication overhead. In particular, to obliviously
access one of n documents, at least O(log n) documents need to be accessed [13]. As pointed
by [25], in some cases, such overhead is larger than downloading the entire database.
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Chen et al. [5] proposed an obfuscation framework to protect SSE schemes from access-
pattern leakage. The framework obfuscates the index of a database in a differentially
private way before applying any SSE scheme. Later, client and server engage in an SSE
scheme as usual. Since the index used to build an SSE scheme is obfuscated, the server
only learns obfuscated access patterns making it more difficult to extract useful information
from such leakage. Although the framework has much smaller communication overhead
compared with ORAM, it cannot hide search patterns, namely whether a keyword has
been searched multiple times, due to the fact that the access pattern for each keyword is
deterministic after outsourcing. Moreover, it might happen that a true positive document
is never returned due to the obfuscation, i.e. the permanent false negative problem.
Motivated by the above differentially private obfuscation framework, we propose a
differentially private searchable symmetric encryption scheme (DP-SSE) based on inner
product predicate encryption to mitigate access-pattern and search-pattern leakage. In
DP-SSE, both access-pattern leakage and search-pattern leakage are differentially private
and the level of such leakage can be configured per query. In particular, during one query
for keyword w, a document D will be returned with probability p if w ∈ D; otherwise,
it can also be returned with probability q, where p, q are determined per query. In this
way, DP-SSE can overcome the permanent false negative problem of [5], hide both access
patterns and search patterns providing stronger privacy guarantees than in [5] while still
maintaining lower communication overhead than in ORAM (O(log log n) v.s. O(log n)),
where n is the number of documents.
The paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2 we review related work, before we in-
troduce preliminaries in chapter 3. We define a stronger privacy definition for differentially
private SSE in chapter 4 and describe scheme construction in chapter 5. We analyze the
security, differential privacy, and complexity of the scheme in chapters 6, 7, 8, respectively.
In chapter 9 we summarize the results of evaluation and present our conclusions in chapter
10.
2
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Searchable symmetric encryption
SSE is an encryption scheme which allows search. It enables a data owner to outsource its
encrypted database to an untrusted server while still preserving the search functionality.
SSE was put forward by Song et al. [29] which suggested several practical constructions
whose search complexity were linear in the size of database and secure under Chosen
Plaintext Attack (CPA). Goh et al. [12] pointed out CPA was not adequate for SSE schemes.
Formal notions of security and functionality for SSE were provided in [8], as well as the first
constructions satisfying them with search complexity linear in the number of results (sub-
linear in the size of the database). From then on, a long line of research has investigated
SSE with various security features, efficiency properties, and flexible functionalities [17, 16,
3, 26, 2, 15]. However, all the above SSE schemes reveal access patterns to gain efficiency,
where access pattern means which documents are accessed and returned in each query.
This access-pattern leakage is proved to have opened the door for powerful query recovery
attacks [14, 32, 4, 22].
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2.2 Query Recovery Attacks
In 2012, Islam, Kuzu and Kantarcioglu [14] demonstrated that when knowing some statis-
tics about a database and the content of a small fraction of queries, a semi-honest server
could recover the contents of all queries with more than 90% accuracy. This is the first
powerful attack (known as IKK attack) utilizing access-pattern leakage. An improved IKK
attack is provided in [4] if additional information, i.e. the size of query results, is given.
An attack targeting dynamic SSE called file-injection attack appeared in [32]. The authors
of [32] showed that an active adversary could inject only a small number of carefully de-
signed files in order to recover the content of queries by observing the access patterns of
the injected files. Liu et al. [22] introduced another attack utilizing search-pattern leakage,
which could be revealed through access patterns or query tokens. They showed that an
adversary who had some prior knowledge about the client’s search habits could uncover
the underlying keywords of the client’s queries.
2.3 Oblivious RAM
ORAM, first introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13], was designed to hide memory ac-
cess patterns of CPU. ORAM is formalized in a game between CPU and memory where the
CPU holds a sequence of memory block locations, say {l1, l2, ...., lm}, to be accessed, and
the memory stores the database, say {d1, d2, ..., dn}. In this game, the CPU wants to blind
memory about which (true) blocks have been accessed for how many times. The authors
of [13] showed that a client could hide entirely the access patterns by continuous shuﬄing
and re-encrypting data as they accessed with a poly(log n) communication overhead and
O(log n) client-side storage. Since its proposal, there has been a fruitful line of research on
further reducing this overhead [30, 1, 24, 31, 9]. Path ORAM [30], popular for its simplic-
ity and efficiency, achieved O(log n) communication overhead with O(log n) client storage
but required block size to be Ω(log n). Apon et al. [1] showed that one can construct an
ORAM scheme with constant communication overhead by fully homomorphic encryption.
Inspired by the idea of utilizing homomorphic encryption(HE) in ORAM, Circuit ORAM
[31], Onion ORAM [9], and optimized Onion ORAM [24] were proposed to further reduce
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the communication overhead to a smaller constant. However, those constants are still too
large (say 100) to be practical with a reasonably small block size. On the other hand, ho-
momorphic encryption operations induce very expensive computation which makes them
far from being practical. It is still open whether or not a non-HE-based ORAM construc-
tion can break the communication overhead lower bound of O(log n) given by [13, 21].
Garg et al. [11] proposed an ORAM-based SSE scheme to hide access pattern with a
communication overhead O(log n · log log n). However, this O(log n · log log n) communi-
cation overhead seems to be too large, since it might lead to, when searching for frequent
keywords, a communication volume larger than directly downloading the entire database
[25].
2.4 Private Information Retrieval
PIR is used to hide access patterns to public databases. It enables a client holding an
index i to retrieve the ith item di from a server holding a public database {d1, d2, ..., dn}
without revealing the index i to the server. PIR was put forward by Chor et al. [6] in
1995 in the setting where there are many non-cooperating copies of the same databases.
They also showed that single-database PIR, in the information-theoretic sense, does not
exist. Later in 1997, Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [20] demonstrated a method to construct
a computationally secure single-database PIR based on Quadratic Residuosity Problem
assuming a computationally bounded server. Unlike in ORAM, single-database PIR may
induce a lower communication overhead. However, it naturally requires to touch every bit
in the database per access in order to hide access patterns, namely a O(n) computation
overhead. Therefore, PIR either requires multiple non-cooperating servers to work or have
a computation overhead linear in size of the database. Moreover, PIR considers a different
threat model where the content of the database is public.
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2.5 Differentially Private Access Patterns
Chen et al.[5] proposed to use a differentially private obfuscation framework to mitigate
access-pattern leakage. The framework is compatible with existing SSE schemes with only
a slight change when building the index. Instead of building an SSE upon the true index
IND = {IND[i, j], i ∈ [|∆|], j ∈ [n]} (where IND[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}, [|∆|] = [1, 2, ..., |∆|] similar
to [n] , and |∆| and n are the number of keywords and documents, respectively) of a
database D, the mechanism first obfuscates IND to IND′ in a way that
IND′[i, j] =

if IND[i, j] = 1
1 with probability p;0 otherwise;
if IND[i, j] = 0
1 with probability q;0 with probability 1 - q.
As a consequence of this obfuscation, the server only learns the obfuscated version of the
access patterns from which it is much harder to derive useful information. However, the
obfuscation is fixed after outsourcing. If a client searches for a keyword w multiple times,
the same obfuscated access pattern repeats. This repetition actually reveals search patterns
which can be used to perform a query recovery attack with high accuracy [22]. Chen et al.
suggested to use the grouping-based construction(GBC) proposed in [22] to mitigate such
attack. In a high level, when a client wants to search for a keyword w, GBC suggested to
search for addtional t keywords, say {w1, w2, ..., wt} besides w in order to make the query
frequency of keywords uniform. However, GBC itself suffers from the following drawbacks:
• The communication overhead grows linearly with the privacy level of GBC. With
GBC, a client needs to search for t redundant keywords per query leading to a O(t)
communication overhead. On the other hand, t defines the privacy level of GBC, the
larger the better since what GBC can provide is a (t + 1)-anonymity notion. [22]
empirically suggested t to be larger than 2.
• GBC leaks group search patterns. Although the server cannot tell which exact key-
word is queried due to GBC redundancy, it can tell that the keyword must be in the
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set {w,w1, ..., wt}. As pointed in the same paper as GBC, it is not guaranteed that
leaking group search patterns is secure enough. One example is, if redundancy group
{wi,0, wi,1, ..., wi,t} is leaked to server, then the next time for searching wi,j, i ∈ [t],
the server has a better chance to guess the underlying keyword, which is 1/(t + 1).
With some prior knowledge, the chance of a successful guess could be higher.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
Let ∆ = {w(1), w(2), ..., w(|∆|)} be the keyword universe of size |∆|, and 2∆ be the power
set of ∆ which denotes the set of all possible documents. Let id(D) be the identifier
of document D, D ⊂ 2∆ be an ordered (based on their ids) list of n documents D =[D[1],D[2], ...,D[n]], and 22∆ be the set of all possible document collections. Let id(D)
be an ordered list of identifiers of all documents in D. Without loss of generality, we
set id(D[i]) = i. Let D(w) denote the ordered (based on their ids) list of all documents
containing keyword w.
3.1 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Definition 3.1.1. (Index). The index IND of D over ∆ is a binary matrix of size |∆|×n
such that
IND[i, j] =
1 if wi ∈ D[j];0 otherwise.
Definition 3.1.2. (Searchable Symmetric Encryption Scheme) (SSE) An SSE
scheme is a collection of four polynomial-time algorithms (Keygen, BuildIndex,Trapdoor,
Search) such that:
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• Keygen(1λ) is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that is run by the client to
setup the scheme. It takes a security parameter λ and returns a secret key sk such
that the length of sk is polynomially bounded in λ.
• BuildIndex(sk,D) is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm run by the client to generate
an index. It takes a secret key sk and document collection D as inputs, and returns
an encrypted index I such that the length of I is polynomially bounded in λ.
• Trapdoor(sk, w) is run by the client to generate a trapdoor τw for a given keyword
w. It takes a secret key sk and a word w as inputs, and returns a trapdoor τw.
• Search(I,τw) is run by the server in order to search for D(w). It takes an encrypted
index I for a collection D and a trapdoor τw for keyword w as inputs, and returns
id(D(w)), the set of identifiers of documents containing w.
We borrow definitions for history, view and trace from [8] to ease the later algorithm
description and security analysis.
Definition 3.1.3. (History). A t-query history over D is a tuple Ht = (D, ~w) (sometimes
denoted by H~w) where ~w = [~w[1], ~w[2], ..., ~w[t]] is the vector of underlying keywords of the
t queries.
An initiation of such a history is called an interaction. A partial history of Ht, say
Hst , is a tuple (D, ~w′) where ~w′ = [~w[1], ~w[2], ..., ~w[s]] and 0 ≤ s ≤ t. A history models
the sensitive information that the client wants to keep private. During an interaction of a
history H, what the server can “see” is the view.
Definition 3.1.4. (View). A view of a history Ht under a secret key sk is defined as
Vsk(Ht) = (id(D), E(D[1]), , ..., E(D[n]), I, τ1, ..., τt) where τi is the query token for the ith
query. The partial view V ssk(Ht) of a history Ht under secret key sk is the tuple V
s
sk(Ht) =
(id(D), E(D[1]), ..., E(D[n]), I, τ1, ..., τs).
A view includes the encrypted search index of D, search tokens as well as some ad-
ditional common information, like the number of documents and the size of encrypted
documents. It should be noted that a partial view also includes the entire encrypted
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search index I. However, a view should not reveal any sensitive information about a his-
tory. This leads to the notion of trace of a history. The trace models the leakage allowed
by an SSE scheme. We will omit the subscript sk when sk does not need to be addressed.
Before defining trace, we first define formally the access pattern and the search pattern.
Definition 3.1.5. (Access Pattern) The access pattern Π~w over an t-query history
Ht = (D, ~w) is a binary matrix of size t× n such that
Π~w[i, j] =
1 if ~w[i] ∈ D[j];0 otherwise.
Definition 3.1.6. (Search Pattern) The search pattern Φ~w over a t-query history
Ht = (D, ~w) is a symmetric binary matrix of size t× t such that
Φ~w[i, j] =
1 if ~w[i] = ~w[j];0 otherwise.
Definition 3.1.7. (Trace). The trace of Ht = (D, ~w) is the sequence T (Ht) = (id(D),
|D[1]|, ..., |D[n]|, Π~w, Φ~w) where Π~w and Φ~w are the access patterns and search patterns
of history Ht , respectively.
It should be noted that the search patterns Φ~w can be revealed in two possible ways. If
the query token is deterministic for each keyword, then (τ1, ..., τt) directly reveals Φ~w. Π~w
can also reveal Φ~w since two identical access patterns of two queries are expected to have
the same underlying keyword.
Definition 3.1.8. (Adaptive Semantic Security for SSE[8]) An SSE scheme is
adaptively semantically secure if for all t ∈ N and for all (non-uniform) probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a (non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm (the simulator) S such that for all traces Tt of length t, all polynomially samplable
distributions Ht over {Ht : T (Ht) = Tt}, i.e. the set of histories with trace Tt, all functions
f : {0, 1}|Ht| → {0, 1}poly(|Ht|), all 0 ≤ s ≤ t and all polynomials P and sufficiently large k:∣∣Pr[A(V ssk(Ht)) = f(Hst )]− Pr[S(T (Hst )) = f(Hst )]∣∣ < 1P (k)
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where Ht ← Ht, sk ← Keygen(1k), and probabilities are taken over Ht and the internal
coins of A,S and the underlying Keygen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, Search algorithms.
A proof for the equivalence of adaptive semantic security and adaptive indistinguisha-
bility for SSE is provided in the same paper [8]. We will show, in later chapter, our SSE
construction provides adaptively semantic security.
3.2 Cryptographic Tools
Let Σ denote a finite set of plaintexts, and let F denote a finite set of predicates f : Σ→
{0, 1}. We say that x ∈ Σ satisfies a predicate f if f(x) = 1.
Definition 3.2.1. (Symmetric-Key Inner Product Predicate Encryption) A
symmetric-key Inner Product predicate encryption scheme for the class of predicates F over
the set of attributes Σ consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
• Setup(1λ) takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a secret key skp.
• Encrypt(skp, x) takes as input a secret key skp and a plaintext x ∈ Σ and outputs a
ciphertext ctx.
• GenToken(skp, f) takes as input a secret key skp and a description of a predicate
f ∈ F and outputs a search token stf .
• Query(stf , ctx) takes as input a token stf for a predicate f and a ciphertext ctx for
plaintext x. It outputs either 0 or 1, indicating the value of f(x).
Correctness. For correctness, we require the following conditions. For all λ, all
x ∈ Σ, and all f ∈ F , letting skp ← Setup(1λ), stf ← GenToken(skp, stf ), and ctx ←
Encrypt(skp, x),
1. If 〈x, f〉 = 0, then Query(stf , ctx) = 1.
2. If 〈x, f〉 6= 0, then Pr[Query(stf , ctx) = 0] > 1− δ(λ) where δ is a negligible function.
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Inner product predicate encryption scheme can be used to build predicate encryption
schemes for classes of predicates corresponding to polynomial evaluation [18]. In general, a
symmetric-key inner-product predicate encryption (IPPE) scheme of dimension d+ 1 can
be used to construct a predicate encryption scheme for the family of polynomials of degress
at most d, i.e. Ψpoly≤d = {fP , |P ∈ ZN [x], deg(P ) ≤ d} where:
fP (x) =
1 if P (x) = 0 mod N0 otherwise.
as follows:
Given a polynomial of degree d, i.e. P (x) =
d
Σ
i=0
ai ·xi = 〈~α, ~β〉 where ~α = (a0, a1, ..., ad), ~β =
(x0, x1, ..., xd).
- The IPPE.Setup algorithm keeps unchanged.
- To encrypt an attribute ~α ∈ Zd+1N , the ciphertext will be ct~α ← IPPE.Encrypt(skp, ~α).
- To generate a token corresponding to a variable x, the token will be
stβ ← IPPE.GenToken (skp, ~β).
Then, whenever a variable x satisfies a polynomial(P(x) = 0), the token generated from it
will also satisfy the encrypted attribute corresponding to the same polynomial.
Full Security of a symmetric-key inner product predicate encryption scheme is defined
by the following game G between an adversary A and a challenger holding IPPE.
Setup: The challenger runs IPPE.Setup(1λ) and keep sk to itself. The challenger
picks a random bit b.
Queries: A adaptively issues queries, where each query is one of two types:
- Ciphertext query. On the jth ciphertext query,A outputs two plaintexts xj,0, xj,1 ∈
Σ. The challenger responds with IPPE.Encrypt(sk, xj,b)
- Token query. On the ith token query A outputs descriptions of two predicates
fi,0, fi,1 ∈ F . The challenger responds with IPPE.GenToken(sk, fi,b).
A’s queries are subject to the restriction that, for all ciphertext queries (xj,0, xj,1)
and all predicate queries (fi,0, fi,1), fi,0(xj,0) = fi,1(xj,1).
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Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Definition 3.2.2. (Full Security for IPPE). A symmetric-key inner product predicate
encryption scheme is fully secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary A, the
advantage of A in winning the above game is negligible in λ.
Roughly speaking, full security guarantees that given a set of tokens of predicates
f1, ..., fk and a set of encryptions of plaintexts x1, ..., xt, no adversary can gain any in-
formation about any predicate or any plaintext other than the value of each predicate
evaluated on each of the plaintexts. The notion of predicate privacy is inherently impossi-
ble in the public-key setting, which is the reason why our idea of construction works only
in the private-key setting.
There is another stronger security notion in the context of IPPE which is simulation-
based security (SIM-security). SIM-security requires that every efficient adversary A that
interacts with the real IPPE can be simulated given only oracle access to the inner products
between each pair of vectors that A submits to the real IPPE. It should be noted that
SIM-security implies full security.
Definition 3.2.3. (SIM-Security for IPPE). Let IPPE = (IPPE.Setup, IPPE.Encrypt,
IPPE.GenToken, IPPE.Query) be an inner product predicate encryption scheme. Then IPPE
is SIM-secure if IPPE is fully secure and for any efficientA, there exists an efficient simulator
S such that the following two games are computationally indistinguishable:
RealA(1λ) :
1. sk ← IPPE.Setup(1λ)
2. b′ ← GA,IPPE(1λ)
3. output b′.
IdealA,S(1λ) :
1. sk′ ← S.Setup(1λ)
2. b′′ ← GA,S(1λ)
3. output b′′.
where game G represents the game defined in full security, GA,IPPE is such a game between
A and IPPE, and GA,S is such a game between A and S.
13
Chapter 4
Definitions
As mentioned in Chapter 1, leaking access patterns or search patterns in SSE might lead
to leaking sensitive information, while hiding them entirely like in ORAM or PIR has
large computation or communication overhead (or both). Motivated by this, we explore a
middle-ground solution that consists in hiding access patterns and search patterns in SSE
in a differentially private way. There are two possible ways to define a differentially private
SSE: one is based on differential privacy for keywords (similar to [5]) and the other one
is based on differential privacy for documents that we define later. In the following parts
of this chapter, we will show implications of the two definitions, demonstrate the relation
between them, and finally give our definition of a differentially private SSE.
4.1 Differential Privacy For Keywords
Definition 4.1.1. (Differential Privacy for Keywords) A searchable encryption
scheme SE : (22∆ ,∆|~w|) → T (H~w) gives -differential privacy for keywords, iff for any
database D ∈ 22∆ and for any pair of neighboring keyword lists ~w, ~w′ ∈ ∆|~w|, namely ~w
and ~w′ differ in only one element, say ~w[i] 6= ~w′[i],
Pr[SE(D, ~w) ∈ S] ≤ ed×Pr[SE(D, ~w′) ∈ S]
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where S ⊂ T (SE), T (SE) represents the set of possible traces of SE , and d is the number
of different documents between D(~w[i]) and D(~w′[i]).
Intuitively, this definition implies hiding search patterns since it guarantees that no one
can determine, through observing the trace (allowed leakage) of the SE, whether a client is
searching one keyword list or the other. However, there is no implication for hiding access
patterns in the above definition. Based on the definition of access pattern, hiding it means
no one can determine whether a document contains a keyword or not. This leads to our
definition of differential privacy for documents.
4.2 Differential Privacy For Documents
Definition 4.2.1. (Differential Privacy for Documents) A searchable encryption
scheme SE(22∆ ,∆|~w|) → T (H~w) gives -differential privacy for documents, iff for any key-
word list ~w ∈ ∆|~w| and for any pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ 22∆ , namely there
exists only one position i and exactly one keyword w, such that w is in either D[i] or D′[i]
but not both,
Pr[SE(D, ~w) ∈ S] ≤ e|~w|×Pr[SE(D′, ~w) ∈ S]
where S ⊂ T (SE) and T (SE) represents the set of possible traces of SE .
Intuitively, satisfying the above definition gives the guarantee that no one can determine
whether a document contains a keyword or not based only on the trace of the SE. Recalling
the definition of access pattern which is just the reflection of which document contains
which keyword, an SE providing differential privacy for documents automatically hide
access patterns. However, the above definition is not directly related to hiding search
patterns.
4.3 Relations
By intuition, differential privacy for keywords implies search-pattern hiding while differen-
tial privacy for documents implies access-pattern hiding. If one can imply the other, we
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can just focus on one notion. However, neither of the above two definitions can imply the
other one.
Theorem 4.3.1. Neither differential privacy for documents nor differential privacy for
keywords imply the other one.
Proof. Refer to appendix A.1.
4.4 Utility
An SE scheme with high utility should satisfy the following two requirements when search-
ing keyword w:
1. Almost all documents in D(w) are returned. In other words, the true positive rate
is high.
2. Not many documents in D \ D(w) are returned. In other words, the false positive
rate is low.
Based on this, we define the utility of an SE scheme as follows.
Definition 4.4.1. (Utility) The utility of an SE scheme is p(1 − q), where p and q are
true positive rate and false positive rate, respectively.
It is easy to see that, when searching for w, an SE which always returns D(w) has utility
of 1, while an SE which always returns the entire database D has utility |D(w)||D| ≈ 0.
4.5 Differentially Private SSE
We define (u, 1, 2)-differentially private SSE as follows.
Definition 4.5.1. ((u, 1, 2)-Differentially Private Searchable Symmetric En-
cryption Scheme) A (u, 1, 2)-differentially private SSE is an SSE of utility u which
provides 1-differential privacy for keywords and 2-differential privacy for documents.
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Chapter 5
Algorithm Description
In this chapter, we first describe in a very high level how our proposed scheme operates, then
we construct a naive SSE scheme (denoted by SSE-Naive) by function-hiding inner product
predicate encryption scheme. Later we modify SSE-Naive to construct our differentially
private SSE denoted by DP-SSE, and finally we introduce 3 variants of DP-SSE: denoted
by DP-SSE-1,DP-SSE-2 and DP-SSE-3. Those 3 variants provide different performance
and privacy guarantees. For reference, table 5.1 contains the main notation used in this
section.
5.1 Construction Overview
We construct an SSE scheme from a functional encryption scheme, in particular a function-
hiding inner product predicate encryption (FHIPPE) scheme. An FHIPPE is an IPPE
scheme which provides SIM-security. FHIPPE is first probabilistic (encrypting the same
message several times usually yields different ciphertexts) which prevents inferring search
patterns from search tokens. Second, FHIPPE’s function-hiding property prevents addi-
tional leakage of search process besides access patterns. To hide real access patterns, we
dedicate a search token generation function to only leak a differentially private version of
real access patterns. The function also makes it hard to infer search patterns from access
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Notation Description
D a document.
id(D) an identifier of a document D.
Cmax the maximum keyword frequency. Note that a document can con-
tribute at most 1 in one keyword’s.
Cw frequency of keyword w.
Smax the maximum number of distinct keywords that a single document
can have.
∆ the keyword universe of the entire database.
| · | the size of ·.
a‖b a concatenates b. a and b are 0-padded to fixed length.
γ an integer distinct from any keyword in ∆.
k−1 an integer distinct from any keyword in ∆ and γ.
[t] {1, 2, 3, ..., t}.
n number of documents.
D a list of all documents ordered by their ids.
D(w) a list of all documents that contain w ordered by their ids.
Φ search pattern.
Π access pattern.
H history.
V view.
T trace.
Γ search token list.
τ a search token.
Table 5.1: Notations
patterns. The reason for this is that the access-pattern leakage is obfuscated in a differen-
tially private way per query, namely the access patterns for two queries searching for the
same keyword are expected to be different with high probability. To summarize, besides
leakage from initialization our scheme would only leak a differentially private version of
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access patterns.
To better understand such access-pattern leakage, we visualize it in Figure 5.1. The
real access pattern of a search for w, denoted by Πˆw, is a binary vector of length n, i.e.
(a1, a2, ..., an) where ai ∈ {0, 1} representing whether D[i] is matched (ai = 1) or not
(ai = 0). In Figure 5.1, when searching for w, a1 = 0 and a2 = 1 mean that D[1] is not
matched while D[2] is matched. The access pattern leaked in our scheme while searching
for w, denoted by Πw, is no longer a binary vector of length n but a multinary vector of
length n+ |h|, i.e. (b1, b2, ..., bn, bn+1, bn+|h|) where bi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, h is a label distribution
function which will be discussed later and |h| represents the size of the range of h which is
quite smaller than n. For i ≤ n, bi represents the times that D[i] is matched. The reason
why bi is multinary is because multiple tokens would be issued per query and one document
might be matched by more than one token. For i ≤ |h|, bn+i represents the number of
non-match tokens that have label i. The reason for these additional dimensions is because
there are tokens that match no documents. Here, h is a function that assigns a label to each
document. Each query token will also have a label assigned by query generation function
to ensure that a query token can only match documents with the same label. It should be
noted that the labels of documents and tokens are known to the server who utilizes them
to reduce computation complexity as will be discussed in 8.2.
Figure 5.1: Access Pattern Leakage
The differential privacy guarantee for such access-pattern leakage comes from the fact
that each bi satisfies some special distribution. In particular, if ai = 1, then bi can be
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viewed as sum of two random variables ui and vi following a Bernoulli distribution and a
geometric distribution, respectively, i.e. ui ∼ Bern(p) and vi ∼ G0(1 − q) where p and q
are two probabilities; while if ai = 0, then bi follows geometric distribution, i.e. bi ∼
G0(1 − q). Similarly, for i ≤ |h|, bn+i can be viewed as sum of two random variables, i.e.
bn+i = un+i + vn+i where un+i and vn+i follow a binomial distribution and a geometric
distribution, respectively, i.e. un+i ∼ B(g(w, i), p) and vn+i ∼ G0(1 − q). Here, g(·, i) is
a database-specific function which will be discussed later. As we will see in 5.3.2, g has
a close relation to h. It should be noted that all the above random variables ui and vi
are independent. Also, for i ≤ |h| + n, j ∈ N, Pr[bi = j] > 0, in other words, the access
pattern for any keyword could be any value in Nn+|h| no matter what the content of each
document is. As a consequence, we can make the following claim.
Claim 5.1.1. The access-pattern leakage of our scheme is differentially private.
5.2 SSE-Naive: A Naive SSE Scheme from FHIPPE
In this section, we introduce a naive SSE scheme that use a function-hiding inner prod-
uct predicate encryption scheme (FHIPPE). For this naive SSE scheme (denoted by
SSE-Naive), we use traditional symmetric encryption denoted by E to encrypt the content
of each document D, and append to the resulting ciphertext denoted by E(D) a search key
generated by an FHIPPE. In particular, SSE-Naive has the following four polynomial-time
algorithms (Keygen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, Search) such that:
• Keygen(1λ): takes as input a security parameter 1λ and returns FHIPPE.Setup(1λ),
which outputs a secret key sk.
• BuildIndex(sk, D): takse as input the secret key sk and the document collection
D. For every document D[i], it calls FHIPPE.Encrypt(sk, genVector(D[i], i)) where
genVector is a function that takes as input a document’s content and its id i, and
outputs a vector vi ∈ Σ. The output of FHIPPE.Encrypt(sk, vi) denoted by I[i] will
be appended to E(D[i]) as search key. We call the collection of all search keys the
search index of D denoted by I which is the output of the function BuildIndex.
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• Trapdoor(sk, w): takes as input the secret key sk and a keyword w, and calls gen-
Predicate(w) to get a predicate set Fw ⊂ F . For every predicate f ∈ Fw, this function
calls FHIPPE.GenToken(sk, f) and outputs a query token τf . Therefore, the output
of Trapdoor(sk, w) is a set of query tokens ΓFw .
• Search(I,ΓFw): takes as input the search index I and query token set ΓFw , then for ev-
ery search key I[i] ∈ I and every query token τf ∈ ΓFw , it calls FHIPPE.Query(I[i], τf )
and, if the output is 0, it returns the corresponding document identifier i. Therefore,
the output of Search(I,ΓFw) is a set of document identifiers id(D¯(w)). Note that
those identifiers are readable to the server, namely the server can respond to the
client with the corresponding encrypted documents {E(D[i]) | i ∈ id(D¯(w))} in one
round.
The function Keygen, BuildIndex, and Trapdoor are executed in the client side and
the output of BuildIndex denoted by I will be outsourced to the server together with the
encrypted documents E(D). The function Search is executed in server side during keyword
search.
SSE-Naive achieve a 1 true positive rate and an approximate 0 false positive rate, so
its utility is approximate 1 according to Definition 4.4.1.
5.2.1 genVector and genPredicate
Function genVector takes as input a document D[i] = {w1, ..., w|D[i]|}1 and its document
id i, and outputs an attribute vector vi used later for encryption. Basically, the attribute
vector vi should be satisfied by any token generated from wj ∈ D[i]. A straightforward
idea is first derive a polynomial P (x) such that for every wj ∈ D[i], P (wj) = 0, and then
obtain the attribute vector from the coefficients of P (x). The following polynomial satisfies
such requirements:
P (x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(x− wj) =
|D[i]|∑
j=0
aj · xj
1We abuse the notation D[i] to represent both the document D[i] and its keyword list.
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Due to the fact that FHIPPE scheme requires every attribute (predicate) to be of the
same length, the polynomial should have the ability to encode the largest document. Thus,
the following polynomial is actually used:
P (x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(x− wj) ·
Smax∏
j=|D[i]|+1
(x− γ) =
Smax∑
j=0
aj · xj
where wj ∈ D[i] for j ∈
[|D[i]|], and γ 6∈ ∆. (Note that all terms with γ are acting as
placeholders, and γ will never be used to generate predicates.)
Directly, we can obtain vi = (a0, a1, ..., aSmax).
The token generation function is much more straight forward given the polynomial
P (x). Let fi be the output of genPredicate(wi), then we can simply assign:
fi = (w
0
i , w
1
i , ..., w
Smax
i )
Now, genVector and genPredicate are both well-defined. It can be easily verified that the
above implementations of genVector and genPredicate satisfy the correctness requirements
and give utility of 1.
5.3 DP-SSE: A Differentially Private SSE from FHIPPE
In this section, we detail our construction of differentially private SSE (denoted by DP-SSE)
which achieves what has been described in 5.1 by modifying SSE-Naive. Specifically,
DP-SSE is a (u, h1 , 
h
1)-differentially private SSE where u = (p + q − pq)(1 − p) and the
values of h1 and 
h
2 depend on how h is constructed. For example, if h is chosen as a hash
function of range [Cmax], then 
h
1 = 
h
2 = ln (1 + p/(q(1− p))). DP-SSE can be viewed as
the meta-scheme of all the other 3 variants. It captures (almost) all the details needed for
their security proofs and privacy analyses.
DP-SSE utilizes vector and token generation functions different from those utilized
by SSE-Naive. Let genVectorRd and genPredicateRd be the vector and token generation
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functions in DP-SSE, respectively. DP-SSE reveals one more thing, a label distribution
function h, to server, which is used in both genVectorRd and genPredicateRd.
(a) Without Revealing Label Distribution (b) Revealing Label Distribution
Figure 5.2: Search Complexity in DP-SSE.
Another difference in DP-SSE is the Search function. By revealing h and the label of
each query token, the server can simplify the search process by evaluating FHIPPE.Query
only on the search key and query token pairs which share the same label (refer to Figure
5.2).
• DP-SSE.Search(I,ΓFw): takes as input the search index I and a query token set ΓFw .
Then for every query token (τf , label) ∈ ΓFw , it calls FHIPPE.Query(I[i], τf ),∀i ∈
{j|D[j].label = label}; if the output is 0, then it returns the corresponding document
identifier i. Therefore, the output of Search(I,ΓFw) is a set of document identifiers
~id. Note that those identifiers are readable to the server, namely the server can still
respond to the client with the corresponding encrypted documents {E(D[i]) | i ∈ ~id}
in one round.
It should be noted that, except for what is mentioned above, all the other parts of
DP-SSE are the same as in SSE-Naive.
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5.3.1 genVectorRd
Function genVectorRd takes as input a document D[i] = {w1, w2, ..., w|D[i]|} and its docu-
ment id i, and outputs an attribute vector vi used later for encryption. Like genVector,
genVectorRd should also be able to be satisfied by any token generated from wj ∈ D[i].
The difference is genVectorRd should also have the ability to be satisfied by a manually
created query token in order to generate false positive results. Following the same idea as
in genVector, we define the following polynomial (given document D[i]):
P (x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(
x− wj‖h(i)‖counterwj ,i
) · Smax∏
j=|D[i]|+1
(x− γ‖0‖0) · (x− i‖0‖-1) =
Smax+1∑
j=0
aj · xj
where wj ∈ D[i], for j ∈
[|D[i]|],γ 6∈ ∆, h(·) ∈ [|h|] is a label distribution function, and
counterwj ,i is a global variable indicating how many times wj‖h(i)‖· have been previously
generated. It should be noted that those three parts of (·‖ · ‖·) are allocated fixed length of
bits each meaning that a difference in any part will lead to a totally different concatenation.
Thus, (γ‖0‖0), (idi‖0‖-1) and (w‖h‖counter) are different from each other. Another thing
to mention is that h takes as input explicitly the document identifier and implicitly all
global variables, then outputs a label.
Similarly, all terms with γ are acting as placeholders and will never be used to generate
predicates. Terms like (i‖0‖-1) will be used when document D[i] is going to be returned
as a false positive result.
Directly, we can assign vi = (a0, a1, ..., aSmax+1) which can be satisfied by any token
generated by predicate f produced by genPredicate(wj‖h(i)‖counterwj ,i) where wj ∈ D[i]
to generate true positive results. In the meantime, such assignment of vi also allows
satisfaction by a token generated by genPredicateRd(i‖0‖-1) to produce false positive result.
The reason for using a counter in genVectorRd function is that we want every token
to at most match one document due to the fact that a false positive token (generated
from id‖0‖-1) can only match at most one document (since every document has a unique
id). Otherwise, if a token could match multiple documents, the server could determine
that this token must be a true positive token (a token that only matches a true positive
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document) and the matched document is a true positive. Such token matching multiple
documents could actually exist if we did not use counter. Suppose that two documents
D[i] and D[j] such that there exists a keyword w ∈ D[i], w ∈ D[j] and h(i) = h(j) (it will
normally happen since |h| is quite smaller than n). Then a token generated by f produced
by genPredicate(w‖h(i)) would match both D[i] and D[j]. With the help of counter, we
solve this issue.
The candidates of h is discussed in section 5.4.
5.3.2 genPredicateRd
Function genPredicateRd takes as input a keyword w, and outputs, instead of a single
predicate as in genPredicate a predicate, a set of predicates Fw, each of which can only
satisfy at most one document (a predicate f satisfies one document D means that the
query token generated from f satisfies the search key generated from attribute v derived
from D). The algorithm is as follows.
In a high level, algorithm 1 flips a coin over every possible true positive predicate to
realize that a true positive document will be returned when selected with probability p and
will not be returned when not selected with probability 1 − p. A true positive predicate
when searching for w is a predicate that will match a document which contains w. Note
that the set of all true positive predicates can be predetermined due to the construction
of search index I. The algorithm does the same thing to true negative documents to give
them a chance of q to be matched.
The algorithm first initializes two empty sets FalsePosSet and TruePosSet. As indi-
cated by their names, they are to carry possible candidates for generating false positive
predicates and true positive predicates, respectively. A false positive predicate when search-
ing for w is a predicate that will match a document which does not contain w. However,
their names only reflect our intention. In fact, candidates in FalsePosSet might also match
true positive documents and candidates in TruePosSet might match no documents. Each
candidate in either set shares the same structure, say X‖Y ‖Z. A candidate is called true
positive candidate if it can be used to generate a true positive predicate. Given a keyword
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Algorithm 1 Generating Predicates When Searching Keyword w
1: procedure genPredicateRd(w)
2: FalsePosSet← ∅
3: TruePosSet← ∅
4: for label in [1, |h|] do
5: counter ← 0
6: for counter < countermax do
7: with probability p, TruePosSet.add
(
[w‖label‖counter, label])
8: counter ++
9: for id in IDdb do
10: with probability q, FalsePosSet.add
(
[id‖0‖-1, h(id)])
11: TValSet← FalsePosSet ∪ TruePosSet
12: PredicateSet← ∅
13: for tval, label ∈ TValSet do
14: PredicateSet.add
(
[genPredicate(tval), label]
)
15: return PredicateSet
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w, all positive documents share the property that they can be matched by some predicate
generated from some candidates in which X = w. Thus, by enumerating all possible value
of Y and Z, the algorithm can simulate the coin flipping process over all true positive
documents. As for true negative documents, the algorithm has not too much information
other than they must be in the n documents. Recall that the search key of each document
has one more term which enables to generate a false positive match. This special term
shares the same structure X‖0‖-1 where X ∈ [n]. Therefore, the algorithm can realize the
coin flipping process for true negative documents by enumerating all possible values of X.
Finally, the algorithm calls genPredicate to convert all selected candidates into predicates.
Algorithm 1 guarantees that one predicate can only satisfy at most one document. How-
ever, it might happen that a document is satisfied by multiple predicates when searching
for keyword w, i.e.
∃D ∈ D, w ∈ D, s.t. f and f ′ are both in PredicateSet.
where f = genPredicate
(
w‖h(id(D)‖counterw,id(D)
)
, and f ′ = genPredicate(id(D)‖0‖-1).
It can be shown that both f and f ′ satisfy document D, and they can be generated
together by genPredicateRd(w) with some probability. The reason why this issue should
be avoided is that it reveals that D must have keyword w since a document can only be
matched by at most one false positive predicate, if D is matched by two predicates, the
other one must be a true positive predicate revealing the document is a true positive.
In order to resolve the issue, an idea is to make the matching count for a document
differentially private, i.e. only by the number of time that a document is matched, one can
not tell whether a document is a true positive or a false positive.
Algorithm 2 adds another process when generating false positive candidates. It repeats
the coin flipping process on potential false positive candidates until the candidate set
becomes empty. In this way, an id can be added to FalsePosSet multiple times (note
that FalsePosSet is a multiset which allows duplicates) meaning that for a document, it
is possible to be matched by multiple false positive predicates. It also means if there is
a document which is matched multiple times, one cannot determine whether it is a true
positive or a false positive. It should be noted that the number of times for a single false
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Algorithm 2 Generating Predicates When Searching Keyword w
1: procedure genPredicateRd(w)
2: FalsePosSet← ∅
3: TruePosSet← ∅
4: for label in [1, |h|] do
5: counter ← 0
6: for counter < countermax do
7: with probability p, TruePosSet.add
(
[w‖label‖counter, label])
8: counter ++
9: tmpSet← {1, 2, ..., n}
10: while tmpSet 6= ∅ do
11: for id in tmpSet do
12: with probability q, FalsePosSet.add
(
[id‖0‖-1, h(id)]) . FalsePosSet
is a multiset, it allows duplicates
13: else tmpSet.remove(id)
14: TValSet← FalsePosSet ∪ TruePosSet
15: PredicateSet← ∅
16: for tval, label ∈ TValSet do
17: PredicateSet.add
(
[genPredicate(tval), label]
)
18: return PredicateSet
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positive candidate to be added to FalsePosSet follows a geometric distribution, which
makes the process of generating false positive tokens converges quickly.
Another issue with Algorithm 2 is that a non-match token, i.e. a token that matches
no documents, must be from TruePosSet. Since there is an upper bound of the size of
TruePosSet, i.e. STmax = countermax · |h|, if there are STmax non-matches, it reveals
that all matched documents are from FalsePosSet which violates the differential privacy
guarantee. To avoid this, we use a similar trick as above to make the number of non-
matches differentially private.
In Algorithm 3 (the actual algorithm used in DP-SSE), some manually made non-match
candidates are added according to a geometric distribution. The geometric distribution
guarantees that the predicate generation process will quickly converge and the number
of manually made non-match candidates will be small. It should be noted that utilizing
algorithm 3 will result in a true positive rate p+ q−pq and a false positive rate q. In other
words, algorithm 3 leads to a differentially private SSE of utility (p+ q − pq)(1− q).
Figure 5.3: Access Pattern Leakage in DP-SSE
In the rest of this section, we show how the properties introduced in section 5.1 are
achieved in algorithm 3. In a high level, as displayed by Figure 5.3, the process of generating
TruePosSet contributes all the Bernoulli distributions and binomial distributions; the
process of generating FalsePosSet contributes all the first n geometric distributions; the
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Algorithm 3 Generating Predicates When Searching Keyword w
1: procedure genPredicateRd(w)
2: FalsePosSet← ∅
3: TruePosSet← ∅
4: for label in [1, |h|] do
5: counter ← 0
6: for counter < countermax do
7: with probability p, TruePosSet.add
(
[w‖label‖counter, label])
8: counter ++
9: tmpSet← {1, 2, ..., n}
10: while tmpSet 6= ∅ do
11: for id in tmpSet do
12: with probability q, FalsePosSet.add
(
[id‖0‖ − 1, h(id)]) . FalsePosSet
is a multiset, it allows duplicates
13: else tmpSet.remove(id‖0‖ − 1))
14: NonMatchSet← ∅
15: for label in [1, |h|] do
16: mark← True
17: while mark do
18: with probability q, NonMatchSet.add
(
[w−1‖-1‖0, label]
)
19: else mark← False
20: TValSet← FalsePosSet ∪ TruePosSet ∪ NonMatchSet
21: PredicateSet← ∅
22: for tval, label ∈ TValSet do
23: PredicateSet.add
(
[genPredicate(tval), label]
)
24: return PredicateSet
30
process of generating NonMatchSet contributes the remaining geometric distributions. Now
we discuss them in detail. Recall the real access pattern and access pattern in DP-SSE
are denoted by (a1, a2, ..., an) and (b1, b2, ..., bn, bn+1, ..., bn+|h|), respectively. Recall that
for i ≤ n, bi = ui + vi if ai = 1 where ui ∼ Bern(p) and vi ∼ G0(1 − q). This is
because a true positive document indicated by ai = 1 can be matched by a true positive
token originated from TruePosSet which is generated from a Bernoulli distribution and
a false positive token originated from FalsePosSet which is generated from a geometric
distribution. For i ≤ n and if ai = 0, the corresponding document can only be matched
by false positive tokens which are generated from a geometric distribution, in other words,
bi ∼ G0(1 − q). For i ≤ |h|, bn+i represents the number of non-match tokens of label
i. The non-match tokens comes from two sources: TruePosSeti and NonMatchSeti where
TruePosSeti and NonMatchSeti represent the subset of TruePosSet and NonMatchSet with
label i, respectively. NonMatchSeti is generated from a geometric distribution. While for
TruePosSeti, each element in it is generated from a Bernoulli distribution and there are
countermax − |{D[j] | w ∈ D[j], h(j) = i}| candidates for non-match tokens, therefore this
contributes a Binomial distribution to bn+i. In the meantime, we obtain the real value of
g(w, i), i.e. g(w, i) = countermax − |{D[j] | w ∈ D[j], h(j) = i}|.
5.4 Label Distribution Function: h and countermax
Label distribution function h works in genVectorRd and affects the construction of genPredicateRd
(since they are highly correlated) and the value of countermax (since it reflects how uniform
h is). Recall the polynomial P (x) used to define genVectorRd(D[i], i).
P (x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(
x−wj‖h(i)‖counterwj ,i
)× Smax∏
j=|D[i]|+1
(x− γ‖0‖0)× (x− i‖0‖-1)) =
Smax+1∑
j=0
aj · xj
In P (x), every keyword w ∈ D[i] is concatenated with the label of D[i] denoted by h(i)
and a counter counterw,i to make such concatenation w‖h(i)‖counterw,i different for every
document which has w, i.e. w‖h(i)‖counterw,i 6= w‖h(j)‖counterw,j for all i 6= j where
w ∈ D[i] and w ∈ D[j]. To achieve this, h is first used to label every document which can
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be viewed as a way of grouping documents by label; then for each small group with the
same label, counterw,· is used to distinguish documents containing w by assigning different
values (choose from N one by one) to counterw,i and counterw,j for every i and j where
h(i) = h(j), w ∈ D[i] and w ∈ D[j]. countermax models the number of distinct values
counter could be.
Scheme h countermax
DP-SSE-1 constant function Cmax
DP-SSE-2 one hash function O
(
log n
log log n
)
DP-SSE-3 two hash functions O(log log n)
Table 5.2: countermax
In this section, we introduce 3 candidates of h, compute the corresponding countermax
(Table 5.2 summarize the results) and apply each of them to DP-SSE to get 3 differentially
private SSE, denoted by DP-SSE-1, DP-SSE-2 and DP-SSE-3, respectively. As will be
discussed in section 8.3, given |h|, the smaller countermax is, the smaller the communication
complexity and the computation complexity will be. There are some other options of h.
However, we will show in section 8.3 that it is NP-hard to find an h with |h| ≥ 3 such that
countermax is minimized.
5.4.1 h As A Constant Function
The most naive way to choose h is to make it a constant function. In order to distinguish
from concatenations for other purposes (false positive or non-match), we can choose h to
be equal to any positive integer. Without loss of generality, we choose h ≡ 1. Then |h| = 1.
By replacing h(·) with 1 and |h| with 1 in DP-SSE, we obtain DP-SSE-1. It is easy to
check that countermax in this case is Cmax.
One might be surprised that such causal choice of h will result in a differentially private
SSE which has the least communication complexity. However, the computation complexity
of DP-SSE-1 is huge. Both communication complexity and computation complexity will
be discussed in section 8.
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5.4.2 h As a Hash Function
Another straightforward way is to choose h as a hash function. By defining h as a hash
function of range [Cmax], i.e. h : [n]→ [Cmax] and applying such h directly to DP-SSE, we
obtain DP-SSE-2.
To calculate countermax in DP-SSE-2, we formulate the following equivalent Balls into
Bins problem: sequentially throw k balls into k bins by placing each ball into a bin chosen
independently and uniformly at random; what is the maximum number of balls in any
bin? The only difference is that we need to distribute |∆| keywords which is analogous
to playing the Balls into Bins game |∆| times. By doing so, we implicitly assume that
keywords are distributed independently.
We first show a Lemma in Balls into Bins problems and then apply it to approximate
countermax with the help of the union bound.
Lemma 5.4.1. Sequentially throw k balls into k bins by placing each ball into a bin chosen
independently and uniformly at random, the maximum number of balls in any bin is
c ln k
ln ln k
where c ≥ 3 with probability at least 1− 1
kc−1
.
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.2
Theorem 5.4.2. If h is chosen as a hash function of range [Cmax], i.e. h : [n] → [Cmax],
countermax = O
(
logCmax
log logCmax
)
= O
(
log n
log log n
)
with probability at least 1− 1
n
assuming
|∆| = O(n) and Cmax = O(n).
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.4
DP-SSE-2 has larger communication complexity but much smaller computation com-
plexity than DP-SSE. The detailed analysis of complexity is in section 8.
33
5.4.3 h As the Better Choice of Two Hash Functions
In the Balls into Bins problems, there is a 2-choice solution in which each ball is put
into the bin with less balls out of two uniformly at random chosen bins. In this way, the
maximum number of balls in any bin is O (log log k) when throwing k balls into k bins.
Inspired by this greedy solution, we can define the output of h as the better output
(the output which makes counter smaller) of two hash functions h1, h2 : [n] → [Cmax],
which will also make countermax smaller. As we will see later, smaller countermax makes a
smaller communication complexity and a smaller computation complexity.
Applying such h to DP-SSE involves modifications of genVectorRd, genPredicateRd and
Search. The reason of modifying Search is as follows. Two choices of h means that there
are two label candidates for every document. With a high probability, both two label
candidates, say l1 and l2, for a document D would be used to generate concatenations
of some keywords wi and wj ∈ D, i.e. wi‖l1‖counterwi,id(D) and wj‖l2‖counterwj ,id(D).
Therefore, we cannot assign just one label to D, instead we need to preserve both labels
for each document and evaluate FHIPPE.Query on document (search key) and token pairs
as long as the token’s label matches either label of the document.
• DP-SSE-3.Search(I,ΓFw): takes as input the search index I and query token set
ΓFw , for every query token (τf , label) ∈ ΓFw , it calls FHIPPE.Query(I[i], τf ),∀i ∈
{j|label ∈ D[j].labels}. If the output is 0, then it returns the corresponding document
identifier i. Therefore, the output of Search(I,ΓFw) is a set of document identifiers ~id.
Note that those identifiers are readable to the server, namely the server can respond
to the client with the corresponding encrypted documents {E(D[i]) | i ∈ ~id} in one
round.
The new DP-SSE-3.Search function is actually a composition of two DP-SSE-2.Search
functions in which one is using h1 to label documents and the other using h2 to do so.
The result of DP-SSE-3.Search is the union of the results of the two. Therefore, the access
pattern observed by the server, which is originally a vector of length n + |h|, changes to
two vectors of length n + |h1| and n + |h2|, respectively. Since |h1| and |h2| are chosen
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the same as |h| = Cmax, the new access pattern becomes two vectors of length n + |h|
where |h| = Cmax. Let (Π(1)w ,Π(2)w ) be the access pattern of DP-SSE-3 when searching for
w where Π
(1)
w = (b
(1)
1 , ..., b
(1)
n , b
(1)
n+1, ..., b
(1)
n+|h|) and Π
(2)
w = (b
(2)
1 , ..., b
(2)
n , b
(2)
n+1, ..., b
(2)
n+|h|). For
i ≤ n, b(t)i represents the number of times that D[i] is matched when it is only labeled by
ht for t ∈ {1, 2}. For i ≤ |h|, b(t)n+i represents the number of non-match tokens to have label
i when all documents are labeled by ht for t ∈ {1, 2}. In order to preserve the properties
introduced in section 5.1, genVectorRd and genPredicateRd need to be changed. Recall the
polynomial P (x) used to define genVectorRd(D[i], i).
P (x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(
x− wj‖h(i)‖counterwj ,i
) · Smax∏
j=|D[i]|+1
(x− γ‖0‖0) · (x− i‖0‖-1) =
Smax+1∑
j=0
aj · xj
genVectorRd. For each document D[i] and for each keyword w in D[i], choose h(i) as
hb(i) where b ∈ {0, 1} and the number of times that w‖hb(i) is chosen as h(i) is less than
w‖h1−b(i). In other words, h(i) is chosen as the value that makes counterw,i smaller. After
h(i) is determined, counterw,i can be determined. In order to add geometrically distributed
variables to both of the two access patterns Π
(1)
w and Π
(2)
w to hide whether a document is
matched by a true positive token or not, we need to modify P (x) in such a way that it
supports adding false positives for both cases while using 2 hash functions. The following
polynomial achieves such property.
P ′(x) =
|D[i]|∏
j=1
(
x− wj‖h(i)‖counterwj ,i
)
·
Smax∏
j=|D[i]|+1
(x− γ‖0‖0)
· (x− i‖h1(i)‖-1)) · (x− i‖h2(i)‖-1)
=
Smax+2∑
j=0
aj · xj
It should be noted that i‖ht(i)‖-1 will never be equal to some w‖h‖counter or γ‖0‖0,
meaning that i‖ht(i)‖-1 can only be used to generate false positive for t ∈ {1, 2}. With
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the new polynomial P (x) and the new way to assign values to h(i) and counterw,i, the new
genVectorRd is well-defined by preserving all the other parts of the old genVectorRd.
Figure 5.4: Access Pattern Leakage in DP-SSE-3
genPredicateRd. The new construction of genPredicateRd is shown in Algorithm 4. Figure
5.4 demonstrates how this algorithm can achieve properties that are similar to the old
algorithm 3. It should be noted that, when searching for w, TruePosSet can only add one
Bernoulli distribution to either Π
(1)
w or Π
(2)
w in every position i where ai = 1, i ≤ n unless
h1(i) = h2(i) in which case the Bernoulli distribution will be added to both. For example
in Figure 5.4, for i = 2, the Bernoulli distribution is added to Π
(1)
w ; while for i = n, the
Bernoulli distribution is added to Π
(2)
w . The existence of those geometric distributions acts
as an important role to provide differential privacy.
With the above modifications, we obtain DP-SSE-3 by preserving all the other parts of
DP-SSE. It should be noted that the true positive rate and false positive rate of DP-SSE-3
become 1− (1− p)(1− q)2 and 1− (1− q)2, respectively, namely the utility of DP-SSE-3
is (1− (1− p)(1− q)2)(1− (1− q)2).
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Algorithm 4 Generating Predicates When Searching Keyword w
1: procedure genPredicateRd(w)
2: FalsePosSet1, FalsePosSet2, TruePosSet, NonMatchSet← ∅
3: for label in [1, |h|] do
4: counter ← 0
5: for counter < countermax do
6: with probability p, TruePosSet.add
(
[w‖label‖counter, label])
7: counter ++
8: tmpSet← {1, 2, ..., n}
9: while tmpSet 6= ∅ do
10: for id in tmpSet do
11: with probability q, FalsePosSet1.add
(
[id‖h1(id)‖ − 1, h1(id)]
)
12: else tmpSet.remove(id) . FalsePosSet1 is a multiset, it allows duplicates
13: tmpSet← {1, 2, ..., n}
14: while tmpSet 6= ∅ do
15: for id in tmpSet do
16: with probability q, FalsePosSet2.add
(
[id‖h2(id)‖ − 1, h2(id)]
)
17: else tmpSet.remove(id) . FalsePosSet2 is a multiset, it allows duplicates
18: for label in [1, |h|] do
19: mark← True
20: while mark do
21: with probability q, NonMatchSet.add
(
[w−1‖-1‖0, label]
)
22: else mark← False
23: TValSet← FalsePosSet1 ∪ FalsePosSet2 ∪ TruePosSet ∪ NonMatchSet
24: PredicateSet← ∅
25: for tval, label ∈ TValSet do
26: PredicateSet.add
(
[genPredicate(tval), label]
)
27: return PredicateSet
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We can use a similar Balls into Bins problem as in section 5.4.2 to show that the
countermax of DP-SSE-3 is O(log log n).
Lemma 5.4.3. Sequentially throw k balls into k bins by placing each ball into the bin
that has less balls out of two independently and uniformly at random chosen bins. The
maximum number of balls in any bin is O (log log k) with probability at least 1− 1
k3
.
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.3
Theorem 5.4.4. In DP-SSE-3, countermax = O (log logCmax) = O (log log n) with proba-
bility at least 1− 1
n
assuming |∆| = O(n) and Cmax = O(n).
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.5
DP-SSE-3 has exponentially smaller countermax than DP-SSE-2 which makes commu-
nication complexity and computation complexity smaller. However, we shall see later in
section 7, the privacy level of DP-SSE-3 is weaker while providing the same utility com-
pared to others.
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Chapter 6
Security
In this chapter, we first show the leakage of DP-SSE. The leakage includes not only (dif-
ferentially private) access patterns like in other schemes but also some meta data specific
to DP-SSE. Then, we prove that with such leakage a simulator can simulate the view of an
adversary who is allowed to adaptively issue queries, namely DP-SSE is adaptively seman-
tically secure in the condition that the underlying FHIPPE scheme is SIM-secure. It should
be noted that the following arguments is based on an abstract h. With minor changes,
one could prove that DP-SSE-1,DP-SSE-2 and DP-SSE-3 are all adaptively semantically
secure.
6.1 Leakage
The leakage here refers to the information that the server can learn about the database
D and the underlying keyword list ~w of queries when hosting the searchable encryption
scheme. In other words, the leakage is the trace of a history. It can be divided into two parts
by the time point when the client begins issuing query tokens, namely L = {Linit, Lsearch}.
Before the client begins the search, the server can learn |D[i]|, Smax, and Cmax, as well
as the id of each document. Let Linit be such leakage during initialization, i.e. Linit ={{id(D[i])}, {|D[i])|}, Smax, Cmax}. It should be noted that id(D[i]) = i.
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After the client begins the search, the server will learn (differentially private) access
patterns Π~w for a list of keywords ~w (allowing repeated keywords) that the client has
searched. Note that Π~w is a differentially private version of the real access patterns Πˆ~w. As
discussed in chapter 8, the client reveals the label assignments to server due to performance
considerations. In that case, label distribution function h would be learned by the server
in addition. We argue that leaking h is of no harm to the scheme since h is independent of
all sensitive information, say the history. Let L~wsearch be such leakage after searching, i.e.
L~wsearch = {Π~w, h}.
After analyzing the leakage of the scheme, we reach a stage to rewrite the definition of
trace which defines the leakage of an SSE scheme (definitions of history and view remain
unchanged).
Definition 6.1.1. (New Trace) The trace of a history H~w for searching for a list of
keywords ~w in DP-SSE is defined as T~w = {Linit, L~wsearch}.
Compared with the old definition of trace, the access patterns are replaced with their
differentially private versions and the search patterns are removed. Some additional infor-
mation is included in the new trace, namely label distribution function h,Cmax and Smax.
We will show in the next section that DP-SSE is adaptively semantically secure under the
new definition of trace.
6.2 Security
Theorem 6.2.1. DP-SSE is an adaptively semantically secure SSE scheme.
Proof. We are going to construct a simulator S that can simulate the partial view of
an adversary given only a trace of a partial history. To be precise, given T (Hst ), S can
generate a view (V st )
∗ such that (V st )
∗ is indistinguishable from V ssk(Ht) for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
all polynomial-bounded function fp, all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, all
distribution Ht, except with a negligible probability, where q ∈ N, Ht R←− Ht and sk ←
Keygen(1k).
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Before describing the details about S, let’s recall the notions of view and trace when
searching for ~w = [~w[1], ~w[2], ..., ~w[t]] in the context of DP-SSE:
• Vsk(Ht) = (1, ..., n, E(D[1]), ..., E(D[n]), I,Γ1, ...,Γt);
• V ssk(Ht) = (1, ..., n, E(D[1]), ..., E(D[n]), I,Γ1, ...,Γs), where 0 ≤ s ≤ t;
• T (Ht) = (1, ..., n, |D[1]|, ..., |D[n]|, h, Smax, Cmax,Π~w[1], ...,Π~w[t]);
• T (Hst ) = (1, ..., n, |D[1]|, ..., |D[n]|, h, Smax, Cmax,Π~w[1], ...,Π~w[s]), where 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
There are three types of data to simulate the view of an adversary A: document
encryption E(D[i]), search key I[i], and search token list Γ.
Simulate E(D[i]):
E(D[i]) is indistinguishable from a random string e∗i R←− {0, 1}|D[i]| since E is semantically
secure.
Γi cannot be simulated directly as E(D[i]) since it should embed some functionalities in
order to enable search. When it comes to the simulation of I, things become more complex.
In order to provide adaptively security, S must commit to an index I∗ before any
queries are issued. In other words, S must generate, at time s = 0, an index I∗ which will
be included in all partial views (V st )
∗ used to simulateA for any 0 ≤ s ≤ t. I∗ should satisfy
two requirements: first, it should be indistinguishable from I; second, it should be able to
simulate all A’s views, namely answer future unknown queries. Recall that I is composed
of n search keys, say I[1], I[2], ..., I[n], generated from documents, say D[1],D[2], ...,D[n],
respectively. S first runs Keygen(1λ) to get a secret key sk∗; then S simulates each I[i] and
each Γ as follows.
Simulate I[i]:
At time s = 0, S only holds T (H0t ) = (1, ..., n, |D[1]|, ..., |D[n]|, h, Smax, Cmax) by
which S generates I[i] as follows: first, S uniformly at random samples Smax + 1 ran-
dom numbers, say U , from a range disjoint with [n], e.g., [5n, 5n+ 1, ..., 6n]; then, S calls
FHIPPE.Encrypt(sk∗, genVectorRd(U, i)) to compute I∗[i]. I∗ can be otained by combining
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all I∗[i] together. We claim that I∗ is indistinguishable from I which will be proved later
in correctness part.
Simulate Γ[i]:
For 1 ≤ s ≤ t, S simulates E(D[i]) and I as above. To construct Γ∗s such that Γ∗s is
indistinguishable from Γs, S does the following (Γ∗i for i < s can be constructed similarly):
first, S defines a set X = D¯(~w[s]) which is the id set of all returned documents and label
each element j ∈ X by h(j); second, S extends X into a multiset X∗ where each element in
X is duplicated according to Πws , i.e., if D[i] is matched by Γs for Π~w[s][i] times, there would
be Π~w[s][i] elements of value i in X
∗; third, S adds Π~w[s][n+ j] non-match predicates with
label j to X∗ for j ∈ [|h|]; finally, set TValSet = X∗ and run all the remaining parts (lines
after 19) of algorithm 3 (together with sk∗) to get Γ∗s. We claim Γ
∗
s is indistinguishable
from Γs which will be proved later in correctness part.
Correctness:
We prove I∗ is indistinguishable from I by contradiction. If there exists an adversary A
which can distinguish I∗ from I, we show that A breaks SIM-security.
Assume A can distinguish I∗[i] from I[i]. Consider a simulator S ′ which simulates
everything like S but with secret key sk. Let I ′[i] and Γ′i be the simulation of I and Γi in
S ′, respectively. Since FHIPPE is SIM-secure, it must be also fully secure. Therefore, no
adversary including A can distinguish I ′[i] from I[i]. Since A can distinguish I∗[i] from
I[i], A must be able to distinguish I ′[i] from I∗[i].
On the other hand, since FHIPPE is SIM-secure, there exists a simulator SFHIPPE such
that it can simulate all A’s views about I ′[i] by some I ′FHIPPE[i]. Since A can distinguish
I ′[i] from I∗[i], it must also be able to distinguish I ′FHIPPE[i] from I
∗[i]. However, I ′FHIPPE[i]
should be an indistinguishable simulation of I∗[i] due to the fact the underlying secrets of
I ′[i] and I∗[i] (plus Γ′i and Γ
∗
i ) are identical (or in other words, the information that SFHIPPE
is able to use to simulate I ′[i] and I∗[i] is identical). Thus, if A can distinguish I ′[i] from
I∗[i], A can break SIM-security contradicting the condition that FHIPPE is SIM-secure.
Using the same proof strategy, we can prove that Γ∗i is indistinguishable from Γi.
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Chapter 7
Differential Privacy
In this chapter, we will show that the meta-scheme DP-SSE is a differentially private
SSE. Then we will show using a similar analysis strategy that DP-SSE-1,DP-SSE-2 and
DP-SSE-3 are all differentially private SSEs.
Recall that a differentially private SSE is an SSE which provides differential privacy for
both documents and keywords.
Differential privacy for documents requires an SSE to satisfy that for any pair of neigh-
bouring databases D,D′ ∈ 22∆ , and for any keyword list ~w ∈ ∆|~w|,
Pr[SE(D, ~w) ∈ S] ≤ e|~w|·Pr[SE(D′, ~w) ∈ S]
where S ⊂ T (SE).
Differential privacy for keywords requires an SSE to satisfy that for any database D ∈
22
∆
, and for any pair of neighbouring keyword lists ~w, ~w′ ∈ ∆|~w| where ~w[i] 6= ~w′[i],
Pr[SE(D, ~w) ∈ S] ≤ ed·Pr[SE(D, ~w′) ∈ S]
where S ⊂ T (SE) and d = d(D(~w[i]),D(~w′[i])).
In the above two definitions, the output of SE is defined as the trace over some history.
Recall the trace T (H~w) of history H~w = (D, ~w) is defined as
(1, ..., n, |D[1]|, ..., |D[n]|, h, Smax, Cmax,Π~w[1], ...,Π~w[t]).
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One might have noticed that except for the access patterns in the trace, all the other
parts are identical among T (D, ~w), T (D, ~w′) and T (D′, ~w). Therefore, we only need to show
that the access-pattern leakage is differentially private in DP-SSE.
Theorem 7.0.1. DP-SSE is a (u, , )-differentially private SSE where u = (p+q−pq)(1−q)
and  = ln
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)
if the output of h only depends on document ids.
Proof. Let M denote the mechanism in DP-SSE and let the output of M be the access
pattern. Since the output of h only depends on document ids, this means that h(i) is fixed
no matter what the content of D[i] is.
Differential Privacy for Documents. Consider a pair of neighbouring databases D and
D′ where D[i] 6= D′[i] and |D[i]| = |D′[i]|, and a list of query keywords ~w ∈ ∆|~w|. Let w be
the keyword such that w is only in one of D and D′.
If w 6∈ ~w, then Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S] = Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S].
If w ∈ ~w, let Λ = {j | ~w[j] = w} and ~wΛ = (~w[Λ[1]], ~w[Λ[2]], ..., ~w[Λ[|Λ|]]) where Λ[j]
represents the jth smallest element in Λ.
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S] =
Pr[M(D, ~wΛ) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~wΛ) ∈ S] =
(
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S]
)|Λ|
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤ maxΠ∈S
{
Pr[M(D, w) = Π]
Pr[M(D′, w) = Π]
}
≤

maxα,β
Pr[ui + vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[v′i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β
, if w ∈ D[i], but w 6∈ D′[i],
maxα,β
Pr[vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[u′i + v
′
i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β
, if w ∈ D′[i], but w 6∈ D[i]
where α = Π[i], β = Π[n+ h(i)]
Recall that for i ≤ n, ui ∼ Bern(p), vi ∼ G0(1−q); for i ≤ |h|, un+i ∼ B(g(w, i), p), vn+i ∼
G0(1− q).
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When w ∈ D[i], but w 6∈ D′[i], let g(w, h(i)) = G where G = countermax − |{j|h(j) =
h(i), w ∈ D[j]}|,
P r[ui + vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[v′i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β
=
Pr[ui + vi = α]
Pr[v′i = α]
· Pr[bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[b′n+h(i) = β]
Pr[ui + vi = α]
Pr[v′i = α]
=

(1− p)(1− q)
1− q = 1− p, when α = 0;
pqα−1(1− q) + (1− p)qα(1− q)
qα(1− q) =
p+ (1− p)q
q
, when α ≥ 1.
(7.1)
Let As,t =
t∑
k=0
(
s
k
)
pk(1− p)s−kqβ−k(1− q),
Pr[bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[b′n+h(i) = β]
=
min(G,β)∑
k=0
Pr[un+h(i) = k, vn+h(i) = β − k]
min(G+1,β)∑
k=0
Pr[u′n+h(i) = k, v
′
n+h(i) = β − k]
=
AG,min(G,β)
AG+1,min(G+1,β)
=
1
1− p ·
min(G,β)∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
min(G+1,β)∑
k=0
(
G+1
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
≤ 1
1− p (7.2)
since that
(
G
k
)
≤
(
G+ 1
k
)
.
As a consequence,
Pr[ui + vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[v′i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β
≤ 1
1− p ·
p+ (1− p)q
q
≤ 1 + p
q(1− p) .
When w ∈ D′[i], but w 6∈ D[i], let g′(w, h(i)) = G where G = countermax − |{j|h(j) =
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h(i), w ∈ D[j]}|,
P r[vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[u′i + v
′
i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β]
=
Pr[vi = α]
Pr[u′i + v
′
i = α]
· Pr[bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[b′n+h(i) = β]
Pr[vi = α]
Pr[u′i + v
′
i = α]
=

1− q
(1− p)(1− q) =
1
1− p, when α = 0;
qα(1− q)
pqα−1(1− q) + (1− p)qα(1− q) =
q
p+ (1− p)q , when α ≥ 1.
(7.3)
Pr[bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[b′n+h(i) = β]
=
AG+1,min(G+1,β)
AG,min(G,β)
When β ≤ G,
AG+1,min(G+1,β)
AG,min(G,β)
=
β∑
k=0
(
G+1
k
)
pk(1− p)G+1−kqβ−k(1− q)
β∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
=
β∑
k=0
((
G
k
)
+
(
G
k−1
))
pk(1− p)G+1−kqβ−k(1− q)
β∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
= (1− p) +
β∑
k=1
(
G
k−1
)
pk(1− p)G−(k−1)qβ−k(1− q)
β∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
= (1− p) +
β−1∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk+1(1− p)G−kqβ−(k+1)(1− q)
β∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
< 1− p+ p
q
; (7.4)
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when β ≥ G+ 1 ,
AG+1,min(G+1,β)
AG,min(G,β)
=
G+1∑
k=0
(
G+1
k
)
pk(1− p)G+1−kqβ−k(1− q)
G∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
=
G+1∑
k=0
((
G
k
)
+
(
G
k−1
))
pk(1− p)G+1−kqβ−k(1− q)
G∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
= 1− p+
G+1∑
k=1
(
G
k−1
)
pk(1− p)G−(k−1)qβ−k(1− q)
G∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
= 1− p+
G∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk+1(1− p)G−kqβ−(k+1)(1− q)
G∑
k=0
(
G
k
)
pk(1− p)G−kqβ−k(1− q)
= 1− p+ p
q
; (7.5)
As a consequence,
Pr[vi = α, bn+h(i) = β]
Pr[u′i + v
′
i = α, b
′
n+h(i) = β
≤ 1
1− p ·
(
1− p+ p
q
)
= 1 +
p
q(1− p) .
Therefore, we obtain
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S] ≤
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)|Λ|
≤
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)|~w|
.
Differential Privacy for Keywords. Consider a database D, and a pair of neighbouring
keyword lists ~w, ~w′ ∈ ∆|~w| where ~w[i] 6= ~w′[i]. Let w be ~w[i], w′ be ~w′[i] and Λ = {j |Πˆw[j] 6=
Πˆw′ [j]} where Πˆw is the real access pattern while searching for w. Define h(Λ) = {n +
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h(j)|j ∈ Λ}. Let U be a list and define UΛ = (UΛ[1], UΛ[2], ..., UΛ[|Λ|]) where Λ[j] represents
for the jth smallest element in Λ.
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D, ~w′) ∈ S] =
Pr[M(D, ~w[i]) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D, ~w′[i]) ∈ S] =
Pr[M(D, ~w[i]) = Π]
Pr[M(D, ~w′[i]) = Π]
=
Pr[M(D, ~w[i])Λ∪h(Λ) = ΠΛ∪h(Λ)]
Pr[M(D, ~w′[i])Λ∪h(Λ) = ΠΛ∪h(Λ))]
=
∏
j∈Λ∪h(Λ)
Pr[Πw[j] = Π[j]]
Pr[Πw′ [j] = Π[j]]
Let η = |{j |1 = Πˆw[j] > Πˆw′ [j], j ≤ n}|. In other words, η is the number of documents
which contain w but not w′. Then the number of documents which contain w′ but not w
is ρ = |Λ| − η. Let ηt = |{j | 1 = Πˆw[j] > Πˆw′ [j] and h(j) = t, j ≤ n}| and ρt = |{j | 1 =
Πˆ′w[j] > Πˆw[j] and h(j) = t, j ≤ n}|, namely ηt and ρt are the number of documents
which contain w but not w′ and the number of documents which contain w′ but not w,
respectively. Therefore, η =
∑
j∈h(Λ)
ηj and ρ =
∑
j∈h(Λ)
ρj.
When j ∈ Λ, based on what have been proved in equation (7.1), (7.3),
Pr[Πw[j] = Π[j]]
Pr[Πw′ [j] = Π[j]]
=

Pr[ui + vi = Π[j]]
Pr[vi = Π[j]]
≤ p+ (1− p)q
q
, if w ∈ D[j] but w′ 6∈ D[j];
Pr[vi = Π[j]]
Pr[ui + vi = Π[j]]
≤ 1
1− p, if w 6∈ D[j] but w
′ ∈ D[j];
Therefore, ∏
j∈Λ
Pr[Πw[j] = Π[j]]
Pr[Πw′ [j] = Π[j]]
=
(
p+ q(1− p)
q
)η
·
(
1
1− p
)ρ
(7.6)
When j ∈ h(Λ), let β = Π[n+ j] and As,t =
t∑
k=0
(
s
k
)
pk(1− p)s−kqβ−k(1− q). Let g(w, j) =
G where G = countermax − |{t|h(t) = j, w ∈ D[t]}| and g(w′, j) = G+ ηj − ρj.
Pr[Πw[n+ j] = Π[n+ j]]
Pr[Πw′ [n+ j] = Π[n+ j]]
=
Pr[bn+j = β]
Pr[b′n+j = β]
=
AG,min(G,β)
AG+η−ρ,min(G+ηj−ρj ,β)
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When ηj ≥ ρj, then G ≤ G+ ηj − ρj.
AG,min(G,β)
AG+ηj−ρj ,min(G+ηj−ρj ,β)
=
ηj−ρj∏
j=1
AG+j−1,min(G+j−1,β)
AG+j,min(G+j,β)
≤
(
1
1− p
)ηj−ρj
. (7.7)
When ηj < ρj, then G ≥ G+ ηj − ρj.
AG,min(G,β)
AG+ηj−ρj ,min(G+ηj−ρj ,β)
=
ρj−ηj∏
j=1
AG−j+1,min(G−j+1,β)
AG−j,min(G−j,β)
≤
(
1− p+ p
q
)ρj−ηj
. (7.8)
The last inequation holds is because of what has been proved in equation (7.4), (7.5)
in the part of proving differential privacy for documents. Therefore,
∏
j∈h(Λ)
Pr[Πw[n+ j] = Π[n+ j]]
Pr[Πw′ [n+ j] = Π[n+ j]]
=
(
1
1− p
)ηˆ−ρˆ
·
(
1− p+ p
q
)ρ−ρˆ−(η−ηˆ)
(7.9)
where ηˆ =
∑
j∈Λ,ηj≥ρj
ηj and ρˆ =
∑
j∈Λ,ηj≥ρj
ρj.
Combining equation (7.6), (7.9), we can obtain that
∏
j∈Λ
Pr[Πw[j] = Π[j]]
Pr[Πw′ [j] = Π[j]]
≤
(
p+ (1− p)q
q
)η
·
(
1
1− p
)ρ
·
(
1
1− p
)ηˆ−ρˆ
·
(
1− p+ p
q
)ρ−ρˆ−(η−ηˆ)
=
(
1− p+ p
q
)ρ−ρˆ+ηˆ
·
(
1
1− p
)ηˆ−ρˆ+ρ
=
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)ρ−ρˆ+ηˆ
≤
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)ρ+η
=
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)d(D(~w),D(~w′))
.
Therefore,
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D, ~w′) ∈ S] =
∏
j∈Λ
Pr[Πw[j] = Π[j]]
Pr[Πw′ [j] = Π[j]]
≤
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)d(D(~w),D(~w′))
.
where d(D(~w),D(~w′)) = |{j | Πˆw[j] 6= Πˆw′ [j]}| = η + ρ.
Utility. The true positive rate and false positive rate of DP-SSE are (p + q − pq) and q,
respectively. Therefore, the utility of DP-SSE is (p+ 1− pq)(1− q).
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Using the same proof strategy as above, we can prove the follow theorems.
Theorem 7.0.2. DP-SSE-1 is a (u, , )-differentially private SSE where u = (p + q −
pq)(1− q) and  = ln
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)
.
Theorem 7.0.3. DP-SSE-2 is a (u, , )-differentially private SSE where u = (p + q −
pq)(1− q) and  = ln
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)
.
However, DP-SSE-3 is slightly different from the other two schemes since the output of
the label distribution function depends on the content of the document. This does not affect
the analysis in differential privacy for keywords. However, in the analysis of differential
privacy for documents, removing or adding a single keyword w to one document D[i] will
affect at most Cmax search keys. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.0.4. DP-SSE-3 is a (u, 1, 2)-differentially private SSE where u = (1 − (1 −
p)(1− q)2)(1− (1− q)2), 1 = ln
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)
, 2 = 2Cmax · ln
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)
.
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.6.
50
Chapter 8
Complexity
In this chapter, we will discuss the complexity of DP-SSE, namely communication com-
plexity and computation complexity. Note that the initialization is not discussed here,
since it can be done efficiently in practice. After the analysis of the meta-scheme DP-SSE,
the communication complexity and computation complexity of DP-SSE-1, DP-SSE-2 and
DP-SSE-3 can be obtained by replacing the hyper parameters(like countermax and |h|) with
corresponding values.
Communication complexity refers to the total network traffic between the client and
the server during the query process for one keyword. It has two parts: the network traffic
from client to server, i.e. all tokens, and the network traffic from server to client, i.e. all
matched documents. Computation complexity refers to the complexity of the function
Trapdoor and the function Search which consume the most computation resources.
8.1 Communication Complexity
When searching for keyword w, the client will generate a list of tokens instead of one and
send them to the server. These tokens are originated from three sources: TruePosSet,
FalsePosSet, and NonMatchSet. The expected size of them is |h| · countermax · p, n ·∞
Σ
i=0
iqi(1 − q) = nq
1− q , and |h| ·
q
1− q , respectively. Therefore, the expected number of
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tokens sent from client to server, denoted by Eclient, is
Eclient = |h| · countermax · p+ nq
1− q + |h| ·
q
1− q
= O(|h| · countermax), assuming nq = O(Cmax). (8.1)
It should be noted that |h| · countermax ≥ Cmax. It should also be noted that the number
of issued tokens is independent from the keyword being searched.
The other part of communication complexity comes from network traffic sent from server
to client, i.e. the matched documents. When searching for keyword w, there would be two
types of documents returned (a document would be returned if it is matched at least once),
i.e. true positives and false positives. The expected numbers of them are |D(w)|·(p+q−pq)
and (n− |D(w)|)q, respectively. Therefore, the expected number of document returned in
total when searching for w, denoted by Eserverw , would be
Eserverw = |D(w)| · (p+ q − pq) + (n− |D(w)|)q
≤ Cmax + Cmax = O(Cmax) (8.2)
It should be noted that the above bound for Eserverw also holds in big-O notation for
DP-SSE-3 even the true positive rate and false positive rate change in DP-SSE-3.
Note that the size of each document is not necessarily equal. To simplify the analysis,
we assume all documents are of the same size Smax. Therefore, the expected traffic volume
when searching for w is
VDPSSE = (E
server
w + E
client) · Smax = O(|h| · countermax · Smax). (8.3)
Note that VDPSSE is independent of the queried w in big-O notation.
In order to compute the communication overhead of DP-SSE, we need to make assump-
tions on the distributions of keywords and queries. Here we give our analysis assuming
keywords follow uniform distribution and Zipfian distribution, respectively.
As for a traditional searchable encryption scheme, it should be able to return all true
positive documents in order to provide high utility, so there is a lower bound of communi-
cation complexity in SSE.
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8.1.1 Keywords Following Uniform Distribution
If keywords are uniformly distributed in the database, i.e. |D(wi)| = |D(wj)| = Cmax, the
communication volume in an SSE when searching for keyword w is
V uSSE = |D(w)| · Smax = Cmax · Smax (8.4)
Note that V uSSE is independent of w. Therefore, we can compute the communication
overhead of DP-SSE.
Theorem 8.1.1. DP-SSE has O
( |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
(amortized) communication overhead
when keywords follow the uniform distribution.
Proof.
VDPSSE
V uSSE
=
O(|h| · countermax · Smax)
Cmax · Smax = O
( |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
(8.5)
It should be noted that the exact value of countermax and |h| both depend on the label
distribution function, i.e. h.
8.1.2 Keywords Following Zipfian Distribution
Zipf’s law states that the frequency of an individual word in a corpus of natural language
utterances is inversely proportional to its rank (the position of it in a sorted list in decreas-
ing order of frequency) [33]. Let w(i) be the ith most frequent keyword in ∆. ∆ is said to
follow Zipfian distribution if the frequency Rw(i) of the keyword w(i) of ∆ satisfies
Rw(i)
Rw(j)
=
j
i
.
Due to the fact that Rw(1) = Cmax, we have
Rw(i) =
Cmax
i
,∀i ∈ [|∆|] . (8.6)
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Note. Usually some stopwords like the, is, and, etc. in ∆ would be removed when building
the index. In this case Cmax would be the frequency of the (t + 1)
th keyword (assuming
there are t such stopwords) resulting that Rw(i) =
t+ 1
i
Cmax,∀t + 1 ≤ i ≤ |∆|. However,
such difference will not change the following approximation of communication complexity
or overhead. Therefore, we use Rw(i) = Cmax/i for simplicity in the following.
To approximate the communication complexity of an SSE, we also need to assume some
query distribution. Here we give our analysis when assuming queries are following Zipfian
distribution. Let ei be the event that w(i) is queried, queries are said to follow Zipfian
distribution if
Pr[ei] =
1
i
N|∆|
,where N|∆| =
|∆|∑
j=1
1
j
. (8.7)
The assumption that queries also follow Zipfian distribution suggests that the more
frequent a keyword appears, the more likely it would be queried.
Theorem 8.1.2. DP-SSE has O
(
log |∆| · |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
amortized communication
overhead when keywords and queries both follow the Zipfian distribution.
Proof. Define w(i) and ei as above.
In order to search for a keyword, the (average) communication volume in an SSE (when
retrieving them in plaintext) would be:
V zSSE =
|∆|∑
i=1
Pr[ei] · |D(w(i))| · Smax
=
|∆|∑
i=1
1/i
N|∆|
· Cmax
i
· Smax (refer to (8.6), (8.7))
= O
(
Cmax · Smax
log |∆|
)
. (8.8)
due to the fact that
|∆|∑
i=1
1
i
= O(log |∆|) and
∞∑
i=1
1
i2
=
pi2
6
.
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Thus, the communication overhead of DP-SSE would be
VDPSSE
V zSSE
=
O(|h| · countermax · Smax)
O
(
Cmax · Smax
log |∆|
)
= O
(
log |∆| · |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
. (8.9)
Note: In the above analysis, the size of one document is treated the same as the size
of its keyword list. In the case where the size of a document is much larger than its
keyword list, the communication overhead of DP-SSE would be smaller. The reason is
that communication overhead comes mostly from query tokens in DP-SSE which is of
the same size as keyword list. If every document is
|h| · countermax
Cmax
times larger than its
keyword list, the above amortized overhead could decrease to O(log |∆|) = O(log n).
8.2 Computation Complexity
In this section, we focus on the efforts that the server needs to compute the query results
given the tokens searching for keyword w. Specifically, we use the number of calls for
function FHIPPE.Query to measure the computation complexity. It worth mentioning that
each call for FHIPPE.Query will take O(Smax) time.
DP-SSE reveals the label distribution and the labels of the tokens. Then the server
only needs to call FHIPPE.Query for each pair of search key and token which share the
same label. For every label, there are approximately O(countermax) query tokens sharing
such label. Therefore, the computation complexity for DP-SSE is O(n · countermax) where
n is the number of documents.
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8.3 Complexity and Label Distribution Function h
From the previous analysis, the communication overhead of DP-SSE is eitherO
( |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
or O
(
log n · |h| · countermax
Cmax
)
depending on the keyword and query distribution and the
computation complexity of DP-SSE is O(n · countermax). Therefore, we can compute the
complexity of DP-SSE-1,DP-SSE-2 and DP-SSE-3 as shown in Table 8.1. Note that each
scheme has two values in communication overhead cell where the first value is in the setting
of uniformly distributed keywords while the second one is in the setting where keywords
and queries both follow the Zipfian distribution.
Scheme |h| countermax
Communication Overhead
Computation Complexity
Uniform Zipfian
DP-SSE-1 1 Cmax O(1) O(log n) O(n
2)
DP-SSE-2 Cmax O
(
log n
log logn
)
O
(
log n
log logn
)
O
(
log2 n
log logn
)
O
(
n · log n
log log n
)
DP-SSE-3 Cmax O(log log n) O(log log n) O(log n · log log n) O(n · log log n)
Table 8.1: Complexity of DP-SSE-1, DP-SSE-2 and DP-SSE-3
DP-SSE-1 has the least communication overhead but the highest computation com-
plexity. DP-SSE-2 reduces the computation complexity to O
(
n · log n
log log n
)
by utilizing
a hash function at the expense of increasing the communication overhead by a factor of
O
(
log n
log log n
)
. DP-SSE-3 further reduces the computation complexity to O(n · log log n)
compared to DP-SSE-2. It also reduces the communication overhead but at the expense
of decreasing the privacy level compared to DP-SSE-2 as pointed out in Theorem 7.0.4.
As what can be seen from Table 8.1, the label distribution function h can influence
the communication and computation complexity. It is not hard to see that when |h| de-
creases, countermax will remain or increase and when countermax decreases the computation
complexity decreases no matter what |h| is. To make DP-SSE computationally efficient,
56
countermax should not be too large. In other words, |h| should not be too small. There
might also be some other options of h where |h| is not too small besides the candidates
introduced in 5.4. In general, given a not-too-small |h|, we can formalize the problem
of finding the best assignment of labels to documents in DP-SSE such that countermax
is minimized as a defective vertex coloring problem. Unfortunately, the defective vertex
coloring problem is proved to be NP-complete[7].
Theorem 8.3.1. Given |h| = c ≥ 3, finding the best assignment of labels to documents
such that countermax is minimized is NP-hard.
Proof. This problem can be formalized as follows:
Given n (0, 1)-binary vectors {X1, X2, ..., Xn} of length Smax, group them into c disjoint
groups, {g1, g2, ..., gc} such that A is minimized over i, h where
A = max
i,h
‖(
∑
gi
Xj)‖∞
where h is the grouping strategy and ‖Xj‖∞ = maxi |Xj[i]|. Call the decision version of
this problem Fp, namely 〈X, c, A〉 is said to be in Fp if and only if there exists a grouping
strategy such that X can be grouped into c groups and no group has sum whose maximum
norm is greater than A.
Let Color = {〈G, k, d〉 |G is (k,d)-colorable} where G is (k,d)-colorable means one can
color all vertices of G with at most k colors such that no vertex is adjacent to more than
d vertices of the same color. Now we reduce Color to Fp. Assume G = 〈V,E〉 where
|V | = n and |E| = Smax,
• Every vertex vi ∈ V is mapped to a vector Xi and set X = {X1, X2, ..., Xn};
• Every edge ej ∈ V is mapped to a number j;
• In a vector Xi, set Xi[j] = 1 if edge ej is incident on the vertex vi; otherwise set
Xi[j] = 0;
• c = k;
• A = d;
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We now claim that 〈G, k, d〉 ∈ Color if and only if 〈X, c, A〉 ∈ Fp. As pointed by [7],
in general graphs, the (k, d)-coloring problem is NP-complete for k ≥ 3, d ≥ 0. Therefore,
given |h| ≥ 3, the problem of finding the best assignment of labels to documents such that
countermax is minimized is NP-hard.
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Chapter 9
Evaluation
In this chapter, we will evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed differentially
private SSE. For effectiveness, we empirically show that DP-SSE can resist access pattern
attacks, i.e. the IKK attack. We also show that the search pattern is hard to recover by
evaluating a clustering algorithm, KMeans clustering. Our experimental results suggest
that the accuracy for both the IKK attack and Kmeans clustering are less than 20%
(baseline 15%) and 17% (baseline 5%), respectively, even when only a small fraction of false
positive documents are added. For efficiency, we report the running time when running
DP-SSE-3 as a representative on Enron dataset in an Intel(R) E7-8870 160-core Ubuntu
16.04 machine clocked at 2.40 GHz with 2 TB of system memory. The results suggest that
one can perform one search in 25 minutes while utilizing 128 cores in parallel.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first describe the experiment
settings, then describe the experiments and explain their results, and finally show the
running time of DP-SSE-3.
9.1 Experiment Settings
Dataset Used and Keyword Generation. We use Enron email dataset for our following
experiments. The Enron email dataset has 30109 emails in sent directory which we
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considered as our document collection. We conduct the same keyword extraction process
as in the IKK paper [14] and then we remove the 200 most common keywords and use the
x most common keywords remaining as keyword universe. We vary the value of x in our
experiments.
Query Generation. It is hard to describe the query distribution even when the whole
dataset is available since search habits of users are expected to vary significantly. Therefore,
we use the Zipfian distribution as in [14, 5] to sample queries from the keyword universe
when conducting access pattern attacks in order to maintain comparability. While con-
ducting search pattern clustering attacks, we use the Zipfian distribution and the uniform
distribution to sample queries from the keyword universe in order to show the general ef-
fectiveness of the clustering algorithm, since this algorithm is expected to be sensitive to
query distributions.
Unified Access Patterns. Recall that the access pattern in DP-SSE is a multinary vector
of length n + |h| denoted by Π = (b1, ..., bn, bn+1, ..., bn+|h|), while the access pattern of a
traditional SSE is a binary vector of length n. To apply IKK -like attacks, we need to unify
these two types of access patterns. Since performing an IKK -like attack on a multinary
vector is non-trivial, we map Π into a length-n binary vector Π′ = (b′1, ..., b
′
n) where b
′
i = 0
if bi = 0 otherwise b
′
i = 1 for i ≤ n.
9.2 Hiding Access Pattern
We replicated the IKK attack on Enron email dataset as in the IKK paper [14] with a
keyword universe size x of 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 2500.
Unlike in the original IKK attack setting where the queries are all unique, we allow
repeated queries. In each keyword universe setting, we generate 200 queries to be issued.
15% of them are known to the attacker, which are chosen from all queries uniformly at
random. We also modifies the IKK attack to adapt to the new setting where queries can
be repeated. The modified IKK denoted by mIKK is detailed in Appendix B.2.
We compare the attack resistance of DP-SSE to this attack with a traditional SSE
scheme (denoted by SSE) and the mechanism in [5] (denoted by OSSE) in their iIKK
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setting where the attacker knows the shards distribution. The true positive rate and false
positive rate are set to be 99.99% and 2%, respectively. In other words, the utility is fixed
as 0.9999(1− 0.02) ≈ 0.98. In each keyword universe setting, we run each attack 20 times
for long enough and take the average recovery rate.
Figure 9.1: Access Pattern Attack Accuracy Varying Keyword Universe Size
Figure 9.1 displays the query recovery rate versus the keyword universe size. The
query recovery rate for SSE, which leaks access patterns, is 97% when the size of keyword
universe is set to 500. The query recovery rate goes down to 60.8% steadily as the keyword
universe size gets larger. This is because the search space becomes larger which makes
it harder for the IKK algorithm (a heuristic algorithm) to find a good solution. After
applying DP-SSE, the query recovery rate drops sharply to 19.5% from 97%. Since 15%
of queries are prior knowledge indicated by baseline, only 4.5% more queries are actually
recovered. Although OSSE [5] also greatly decreases the query recovery rate (from 97%
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to 23.5%), it is still slightly worse than DP-SSE for all universe sizes. The advantage of
DP-SSE over OSSE in resisting the attack comes from two parts. First, DP-SSE provides
independent randomness per query, i.e. two queries searching for the same keyword will
almost always get different results. Therefore, the attacker cannot easily recover queries
which are searching for keywords previously known to the attacker. Second, the mIKK
attack to DP-SSE has to search in a larger space for good solutions. Perfectly conducting
the IKK attack needs solving an NP -complete problem, which is infeasible. Thus, usually
a heuristic solution is taken to look for good but maybe suboptimal solutions. The solution
space in DP-SSE is |∆||∆| which is much larger than |∆|!, the size of the solution space in
the other setting.
9.3 Hiding Search Pattern
In order to show DP-SSE can actually hide search patterns, we run a clustering algorithm
(KMeans) to cluster queries based on their access patterns. If the queries cannot be well-
clustered, it means that it is difficult to determine whether a set of queries are searching
for the same keywords or not, namely the search patterns are hidden.
The set to be clustered is composed of unified access patterns, namely (0,1)-binary
vectors of length n where n is the number of documents. The size of the dataset is limited
to 500, namely 500 binary vectors per set. The underlying keywords per dataset are
sampled from a keyword population of size 25 based on some distribution (Zipfian or
uniform distribution). The keyword population contains either 25 consecutive keywords
in a sorted keyword universe list in decreasing order of frequency or 25 randomly chosen
keywords in ∆. Let ∆i→j be a keyword population of size j − i which contains w(t) for
t ∈ (i, j] where w(t) is the tth most frequent keyword in ∆.
We run KMeans clustering algorithm for 15 times per access pattern set and report
the average clustering accuracy. The clustering accuracy is measured by the ratio of the
number of vectors that are correctly clustered v.s. the total number of vectors. By correctly
clustered, we mean that a vector is generated by searching for the same keyword as the
label of its cluster. The label of a cluster is the keyword which generates the most vectors
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in it.
Figure 9.2: Clustering Accuracy, Queries Are Sampled From Uniform Distribution
Figure 9.2 and figure 9.3 show the clustering accuracy for different keyword populations
when varying the false positive rate when queries are sampled from a Zipfian distribution
and a uniform distribution, respectively. The true positive rate is fixed as 99.99%. The
baseline represents the clustering accuracy for random guessing. It should be noted that the
mechanism in [5] does not hide search patterns and simply running our clustering algorithm
on that mechanism has an accuracy of approximately 100%. While for our scheme, DP-SSE,
the clustering accuracy decreases sharply when increasing the false positive rate from 0 to
0.1%, then the accuracy decreases smoothly when further increasing the false positive rate.
When the false positive rate is larger than 0.5%, the clustering accuracy becomes less than
17% which is sufficiently low to hide search patterns. While focusing on each false positive
rate, where the keyword populations are sampled seem to have no clear impact on clustering
accuracy, namely queries are all hard to cluster no matter whether they are generated from
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Figure 9.3: Clustering Accuracy, Queries Are Sampled From Zipfian Distribution
frequent or relatively non-frequent keywords. Comparing figure 9.2 to figure 9.3, it can be
seen that how queries are sampled does not influence the clustering accuracy significantly.
The reason might be the sample size is too small to show the potential impact of query
distributions.
Figure 9.4 shows the clustering accuracy when the keyword population is sampled
uniformly at random from a large keyword universe of size 2500. It should be noted that
such keyword population might contain both frequent and non-frequent keywords whose
real access patterns are quite different and easy to distinguish. However, the experimental
results show that the differentially private access patterns for such keywords are still hard
to separate.
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Figure 9.4: Clustering Accuracy, Keyword Population are Randomly Chosen from ∆0→2500.
9.4 Running Time
Here we report the running time to build and run DP-SSE-3 on Enron dataset including the
running time of Keygen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor and Search which compose DP-SSE-3.
Here we assume the index of the database is already generated and the content of documents
is already encrypted under some symmetric encryption scheme since these are all common
operations for almost all SSE schemes. In all of the following experiments, we set p and
q be 0.9999 and 0.01, respectively. In other words, the true positive rate is set to be
1− (1− p)(1− q)2 ≈ 0.9999 and the false positive rate is set to be 1− (1− q)2 ≈ 0.02.
In our implementation, we use the function-hiding inner product encryption scheme
(denoted by IPE) proposed in [19] to implement our function-hiding inner product predicate
encryption scheme FHIPPE (refer to Appendix B.1 for details). We limit the number of
keywords for each document to be no more than 300 by splitting large documents into
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smaller ones. It should be noted that more than 97% of documents have no more than
300 keywords. After splitting, the number of documents increases by 1.5% to 30562, i.e.
n = 30562 and Cmax becomes approximate 2000. By using 2 hash functions, we manage
to limit countermax to 3.
Keygen FHIPPE.Encrypt FHIPPE.GenToken FHIPPE.Query
17.1 hours 1.77s 0.28s 1.25s
Table 9.1: Running Time
# cores BuildIndex(min) Trapdoor(s) Search(min)
4 272.5 580.7 933.1
8 136.3 290.5 463.4
16 68.2 145.3 235.21
32 34.1 72.8 119.9
64 17.1 36.4 62.2
128 8.5 18.2 34.0
160 6.9 14.7 27.9
Table 9.2: Running Time in Parallel
Table 9.1 displays the running time for functions Keygen, FHIPPE.Encrypt, FHIPPE.GenToken
and FHIPPE.Query. Due to their computation nature, such functions cannot be trivially
parallelized. It should be noted that although Keygen takes long to run, it only needs to
run once in the setup phase. Recall that in section 5.2, BuildIndex, Trapdoor and Search
are constructed by constantly invoking Encrypt, GenToken, Query in FHIPPE, respectively.
Such property makes it easy to parallelize these functions. It should be noted that BuildIn-
dex only needs to run once in setup phase. For each keyword search, Trapdoor and Search
are both invoked once. In each invocation of Trapdoor, FHIPPE.GenToken is invoked ap-
proximately Cmax · countermax · p+ 2 · q · n+ q ·Cmax ≈ 6630 times. Since each invocation
of FHIPPE.GenToken takes about 0.35s, the function Trapdoor takes about 38.5 minutes
while running in single CPU core. In each invocation of Search, FHIPPE.Query would be
invoked approximately 2 · n · (countermax · p + q) ≈ 183965 times. Since each invocation
66
of FHIPPE.Query takes about 1.25s, the function Search takes about 64 hours in single
thread.
Table 9.2 shows the running time for BuildIndex, Trapdoor and Search when running
on multiple CPU cores. BuildIndex only needs to run once and it takes 4.5 hours on 4
cores and only 6.9 minutes on 160 cores in parallel. Trapdoor and Search are invoked per
query. It takes about 10 minutes to run Trapdoor on 4 cores and less than 1 minute when
running on more than 64 cores. Search, which is the most computationally intensive, takes
more than 15 hours on 4 cores and less than 30 minutes on 160 cores.
67
Chapter 10
Conclusions
Searchable symmetric encryption allows a data owner to outsource its data to a cloud server
while maintaining the ability and therefore to search over it. Most existing SSE schemes
leak access patterns, and therefore are vulnerable to attacks like the IKK attack. Oblivious
RAM can be used to construct SSE scheme that fully hides access patterns. However such
schemes suffer from heavy communication overhead making them impractical. Chen et al.
proposed an obfuscation framework to protect existing SSE schemes against access-pattern
leakage. The framework can produce differentially private access patterns per keyword.
However, it cannot hide whether the same keyword is being searched multiple times or, in
other words, the search patterns.
In this work, we proposed a stronger security definition for differentially private search-
able symmetric encryption scheme and presented a real construction, DP-SSE, fulfilling it.
On the one hand, DP-SSE is adaptively semantically secure and provides differential pri-
vacy for both keywords and documents implying search-pattern hiding and access-pattern
hiding. On the other hand, DP-SSE has communication overhead as small as O(log log n)
and computation complexity of O(n · log log n) while searching for relatively frequent key-
words. When assuming queries follow Zipfian distribution, the amortized communication
overhead would be O(log n log log n). By replicating the IKK attack, we showed that our
proposed scheme could actually hide access patterns and make it difficult for the server to
extract useful information from differentially private access-pattern leakage. By performing
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KMeans clustering, we were able to show that inferring search patterns from differentially
private access pattern leakage is difficult, namely search patterns are hidden.
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Appendix A
Proofs
It should be noted that proofs of Lemma A.2 and A.3 are inspired by the proofs in section
1.2 of Mitzenmacher’s thesis [23].
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
Proof by example. Here we give two SSE schemes in which each only gives either differential
privacy for keywords (dp-keywords) or differential privacy for documents (dp-documents)
but not both.
An SSE gives only dp-keywords. Let A be an SSE scheme. Modify A to A′ in the
following way:
• When intending to query w, query w′ instead where w′ = w with probability p and
w′ = w′′ with probability q =
1− p
|∆ \ w| for w
′′ ∈ ∆ \ w.
It can be shown that A only gives dp-keywords but not dp-documents.
An SSE gives only dp-documents. We modify DP-SSE to DP-SSE′ in the following
way:
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• When intending to query w, add plaintext w into query tokens set.
• All the other parts remain the same.
It can be shown that DP-SSE′ gives dp-documents but not dp-keywords. The reason is the
actual search content is revealed in each query token set. Anyone can obtain the search
pattern once upon receiving the query tokens.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4.1
Let ei,j be the event that the i
th bin has at least j balls, then
Pr[ei,j] ≤
(
k
j
)(
1
k
)j
≤
(
ke
j
)j
·
(
1
k
)j
=
(
e
j
)j
Let j =
c ln k
ln ln k
where c ≥ 3 is a constant,
Pr[ei,j] ≤
(
e
j
)j
= exp
(
c ln k
ln ln k
· ln e ln ln k
c ln k
)
= exp
(
c ln k
ln ln k
· (1 + ln ln ln k − ln ln k − ln c)
)
≤ exp
(
c ln k
ln ln k
· (ln ln ln k − ln ln k)
)
= exp
(
−c ln k + c ln k · ln ln ln k
ln ln k
)
≤ exp (−(c− 1) ln k) when k is large.
=
1
kc−1
.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4.3
We first define some notations, Lemmas and Claims. Then we use such things to do the
proof.
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Define the height of a ball as i if it is the ith ball thrown into the bin. Let Ball#≤i and
Bin#≤i be the number of balls of height at most i and the number of bins that has at most
i balls, respectively. Define Ball#=i, Ball#≥i, Bin#≥i and Bin#=i in a similar way, then
we can obtain
Ball#=i ≥ Bin#≥i.
Lemma A.3.1. Suppose at most an α fraction of the bins have been marked. Let X be
the number of marked balls (a ball is marked if both of the bins it inspects are marked).
Then E[X] ≤ kα2.
Claim A.3.2. Suppose α2 ≥ 3c log k
k
, then X ≤ 2kα2 with probability at least 1 − 1
kc
where c is a constant.
Proof. Let µ = E[X], δ =
λ
µ
=
nα2
µ
, use the Chernoff bound,
Pr[X ≥ 2kα2] ≤ Pr[X − µ ≥ kα2]
≤ exp
(
− δ
2µ
2µ+ λ
)
= exp
(
− λ
2
2µ+ λ
)
≤ exp
(
−λ
3
)
, since λ ≥ µ
≤ exp (−c log k) ≤ 1
kc
, since λ = kα2 ≥ 3c log k.
Define α3 =
1
3
and αi = 2α
2
i−1 for i ≥ 4, then we have
αi =
1
2
·
(
2
3
)2i−3
.
Define ei be the event that Bin#≥i ≤ kαi. Notice that at most a third of the bins can have
3 balls or more, we have
Pr[e3] = Pr[Bin#≤ k
3
] = 1.
Claim A.3.3. If α2i ≥
3c log k
k
, then Pr[¬ei+1] ≤ i+ 1
kc
.
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Proof. Proof by induction.
Base case. When i = 3, Pr[¬e3] = 1− Pr[e3] = 0 < 4
k
.
When i = j, assume Pr[¬ej] ≤ j
kc
for j ≥ 3.
When i = j + 1, since ¬ej+1 ⊂ ¬ej.
Pr[¬ej+1] = Pr[¬ej+1|ej]Pr[ej] + Pr[¬ej] ≤ Pr[¬ej+1|ej] + Pr[¬ej].
By Claim A.3.2,
Pr[¬ej+1|ej] = Pr[Bin#≥k2α2j |Bin#≤kαj ] ≤
1
kc
.
Therefore,
Pr[¬ej+1] ≤ Pr[¬ej+1|ej] + Pr[¬ej] ≤ 1
kc
+
j
kc
=
j + 1
kc
.
Now we do the final proof in two steps. We first show that when i is small i.e. i =
O(log log k), Bin#≤i is bounded by kαi which will decrease quadratically. Then we show
that when i becomes larger than O(log log n), Bin#≥i will be smaller than 1 with high
probability, in other words, no bin will have balls more than O(log log n).
When α2i ≥
3c log k
k
, by union bound
Pr[∪i¬ei] ≤
∑
i
Pr[¬ei] ≤ 1
kc−2
. (A.1)
This means that the fraction of bins to have at most i balls is bounded by αi. The
largest i denoted by i∗ to make α2i ≥
3c log k
k
is i∗ ≈ log2 log3/2 k + 2.
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When α2i ≤
3c log k
k
, or in other words, i ≥ i∗, by union bound,
Pr[Ball#=i∗+1 = j] ≤
(
k
j
)
(α2i∗)
j ≤
(
k
j
)(
3c log k
k
)j
≤
(
ke
j
)j
·
(
3c log k
k
)j
=
(
3ce log k
jk
)j
≤ 1
kj−1
, when k is large.
P r[Ball#=i∗+2 ≥ 1] =
k∑
j=2
(
j
2
)(
j
k
)2
Pr[Ball#=i∗+1 = j]
≤
k∑
j=2
j2
2
(
j
k
)2
1
kj−1
≤ 2
2
2
(
2
k
)2
1
k
+
32
2
(
3
k
)2
1
k2
+
k∑
j=4
j2
2
(
j
k
)2
1
kj−1
= O(
1
k3
). (A.2)
Combining equation (A.1), (A.2), we can obtain that the number of balls in any bin is no
more than i∗ + 2 = O(log log k) with probability at least min
(
1− 1
kc−2
, 1− 1
k3
)
when
c ≥ 3.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5.4.2
Recall that applying the 1-choice strategy to DP-SSE is analogous to play the Balls into
Bins game in the 1-choice setting for |∆| times. Since Cmax = O(n), |∆| = O(n), choose c
in Lemma A.2 as c = logk n|∆|+ 1, then by union bound,
Pr[countermax = O
(
ln k
ln ln k
)
] ≥ 1− |∆| · 1
kc
= 1− |∆| 1
klogk n|∆|
= 1− 1
n
.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 5.4.4
Recall that applying the 2-choice strategy to DP-SSE is analogous to play the Balls into
Bins game in the 2-choice setting for |∆| times. Since Cmax = O(n), |∆| = O(n), choose c
in Lemma A.3 as c = logk n|∆|+ 2 which is no more than 5, then by union bound,
Pr[countermax = O(log log k)] ≥ 1− |∆| · 1
kc
= 1− |∆| 1
klogk n|∆|
= 1− 1
n
.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 7.0.4
We only focus on the differential privacy for documents part of DP-SSE-3.
Recall what has been mentioned in section 5.4.3, the access pattern of DP-SSE-3 when
querying w is (Π
(1)
w ,Π
(2)
w ) where Π
(t)
w is a multinary vector of length n + |h| for t ∈ {1, 2}.
Let Π
(t)
w = (b
(t)
1 , ..., b
(t)
n , b
(t)
n+1, ..., b
(t)
n+h) for t ∈ {1, 2} For and where for enumerating. Let
Πˆw = (a1, ..., an) be the real access pattern when querying w.
Recall that
• for i ≤ n,
– if ai = 0, then b
(1)
i = v
(1)
i and b
(2)
i = v
(2)
i where v
(1)
i ∼ G0(1 − q) and v(2)i ∼
G0(1− q);
– if ai = 1 and assuming ht∗(i) is selected by w to generate the concatenation
when generating search key for D(i), then b(t∗)i = ui + v(t
∗)
i and b
(1−t∗)
i = v
(1−t∗)
i
where ui ∼ Bern(p), v(1)i ∼ G0(1− q), v(2)i ∼ G0(1− q) and t∗ ∈ {1, 2};
• for i ≤ |h|, b(t)n+i = u(t)n+i + v(t)n+i for t ∈ {1, 2} where u(t)n+i ∼ B(g(t)(w, i), p) and
v
(t)
n+i ∼ G0(1− q).
The value of g(t)(w, i) indicates the number of possible non-match tokens originated from
TruePosSet to have label i when Search considers only ht to label documents. In other
words,
g(t)(w, i) = countermax − |{D[j] | ht(j) = i, w ∈ D[j] and ht(j) is selected by w}|.
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Now we begin our proof.
Differential Privacy for Documents. Given a pair of neighbouring databases D and
D′ where D[i] 6= D′[i] and |D[i]| = |D′[i]|, and a list of querying keywords ~w ∈ ∆|~w|. Let w
be the keyword such that it is only in one of D and D′.
If w 6∈ ~w, then Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S] = Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S].
If w ∈ ~w, let Λ = {j | ~w[j] = w} and ~wΛ = (~w[Λ[1]], ~w[Λ[2]], ..., ~w[Λ[|Λ|]]) where Λ[j]
represents the jth smallest element in Λ.
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S] =
Pr[M(D, ~wΛ) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~wΛ) ∈ S] =
(
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S]
)|Λ|
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤ max(Π(1),Π(2))∈S
Pr[M(D, w) = (Π(1),Π(2))]
Pr[M(D′, w) = (Π(1),Π(2))] . (A.3)
It should be noted that when querying w, the distributions of all b
(t)
j s ( and b
′(t)
j ) are
determined given the content of database D (and D′). Let Υ(t) = {j | b(t)j 6= b′(t)j } where
b
(t)
j 6= b′(t)j stands for that b(t)j and b′(t)j follow different distributions. Let Υ(t)≤n = {j | j ∈
Υ(t), j ≤ n} and Υ(t)>n = {j | j ∈ Υ(t), j > n}. Then we have |Υ(t)≤n| ≤ Cmax and Υ(t)>n ≤ |h| =
Cmax. The reason for such bounds is that adding or removing one keyword w to or from a
document D[i] to obtain D′[i] can only affect the search keys of the documents containing
w of which the number is |D′(w)| ≤ Cmax. Let Υ(t)≤n,D>D′ = {j | j ∈ Υ(t)j≤n, b(t)j > b′(t)j } where
b
(t)
j > b
′(t)
j means b
(t)
j = uj + v
(t)
j but b
′(t)
j = v
′(t)
j where uj ∼ Bern(p), v(t)j ∼ G0(1− q) and
v
′(t)
j ∼ G0(1− q). Let Υ(t)≤n,D<D′ = Υ(t)j≤n \Υ(t)j≤n,D>D′ . It should be noted that
∀j ∈ Υ(t)j≤n,D>D′ ,
P r[b
(t)
j = α]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α]
≤ p+ (1− p)q
q
( refer to (7.1)) ;
∀j ∈ Υ(t)j≤n,D<D′ ,
P r[b
(t)
j = α]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α]
≤ 1
1− p ( refer to (7.3)) .
Let Υ
(t)
>n,D>D′ = {j | j ∈ Υ(t)>n, b(t)j > b′(t)j } where b(t)j > b′(t)j means that g(t)(w, j − n) >
g′(t)(w, j − n) where b(t)j = u(t)j + v(t)j and b′(t)j = u′(t)j + v′(t)j where u(t)j ∼ B(g(t)(w, j −
n), p), u
′(t)
j ∼ B(g′(t)(w, j − n), p), v(t)j ∼ G0(1− q) and v′(t)j ∼ G0(1− q). Let Υ(t)j>n,D<D′ =
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Υ
(t)
>n \Υ(t)>n,D>D′ . It should be noted that
∀j ∈ Υ(t)>n,D>D′ ,
P r[b
(t)
j = α]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α]
≤
(
1− p+ p
q
)g(t)(w,j−n)−g′(t)(w,j−n)
( refer to (7.8));
∀j ∈ Υ(t)>n,D<D′ ,
P r[b
(t)
j = α]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α]
≤
(
1
1− p
)g′(t)(w,j−n)−g(t)(w,j−n)
( refer to (7.7)).
Now we can rewrite Equation (A.3) as
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤ max(Π(1),Π(2))∈S
Pr[M(D, w) = (Π(1),Π(2))]
Pr[M(D′, w) = (Π(1),Π(2))]
= max
α
(t)
j
∏
t∈{1,2}
∏
j∈Υ(t)
Pr[b
(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
(A.4)
When w ∈ D[i] but w 6∈ D′[i],∑
t∈{1,2}
|Υ(t)≤n,D>D′| − |Υ(t)≤n,D<D′| = 1 and
∑
t∈{1,2}
∑
j∈Υ(t)>n
g(t)(w, j − n)− g′(t)(w, j − n) = −1.
Let A =
∑
t∈{1,2}
|Υ(t)≤n,D>D′| and B =
∑
t∈{1,2}
∑
j∈Υ(t)
>n,D<D′
g′(t)(w, j − n) − g(t)(w, j − n). Then
A ≤ Cmax, B ≤ Cmax and
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤ maxα(t)j
∏
t∈{1,2}
∏
j∈Υ(t)
Pr[b
(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
≤
(
p+ (1− p)q
q
)A
·
(
1
1− p
)A−1
·
(
1− p+ p
q
)B−1
·
(
1
1− p
)B
=
(
p+ (1− q)q
(1− p)q
)A+B−1
<
(
1 +
p
(1− p)q
)2Cmax
. (A.5)
When w 6∈ D[i] but w ∈ D′[i],∑
t∈{1,2}
|Υ(t)≤n,D>D′| − |Υ(t)≤n,D<D′| = −1 and
∑
t∈{1,2}
∑
j∈Υ(t)>n
g(t)(w, j − n)− g′(t)(w, j − n) = 1.
Let A =
∑
t∈{1,2}
|Υ(t)≤n,D<D′| and B =
∑
t∈{1,2}
∑
j∈Υ(t)
>n,D>D′
g(t)(w, j − n) − g′(t)(w, j − n). Then
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A ≤ Cmax, B ≤ Cmax and
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤ maxα(t)j
∏
t∈{1,2}
∏
j∈Υ(t)
Pr[b
(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
Pr[b
′(t)
j = α
(t)
j ]
≤
(
p+ (1− p)q
q
)A−1
·
(
1
1− p
)A
·
(
1− p+ p
q
)B
·
(
1
1− p
)B−1
=
(
p+ (1− q)q
(1− p)q
)A+B−1
<
(
1 +
p
(1− p)q
)2Cmax
. (A.6)
As a consequence,
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S] ≤
(
1 +
p
(1− p)q
)2Cmax
.
Therefore, we obtain
Pr[M(D, ~w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, ~w) ∈ S] ≤
(
Pr[M(D, w) ∈ S]
Pr[M(D′, w) ∈ S]
)|Λ|
≤
(
1 +
p
q(1− p)
)|~w|·2Cmax
.
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Appendix B
Algorithms
B.1 A Function-Hiding Inner Product Predicate En-
cryption Scheme
Fix a security parameter λ, and let n be a positive integer. The function-hiding inner
product predicate encryption scheme is constructed as follows.
• Setup(1λ): The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter and output a
secret key sk as follows. It first samples an asymetric bilinear group (G1,G2,GT , q, e)
and chooses generators g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, then it samples B ← GLn(Zq) and sets
B∗ = det(B) · (B−1)T . Finally, it sets sk = (g1, g2,B,B∗).
• Encrypt(sk, ~x): The Encrypt takes as input the secret key sk and an attribute ~x, then
samples α
R←− Zq and finally outputs
c~x = (C1, C2) =
(
g
α·det(B)
1 , g
α·~x·B
1
)
.
• GenToken (sk, ~f): The GenToken takes as input the secret key sk and an predicate
~f , then samples β, γ
R←− Zq and finally outputs
τ~f = (T1, T2) =
(
gβ2 , g
βγ·~f ·B∗
2
)
.
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• Query(c~x, τ~f ): The Query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext c~x and a token τ~f ,
then computes
D1 = e(C1, T1) and D2 = e(C2, T2)
finally returns True if D01 = D2, otherwise returns False.
Correctness.
D1 = e(C1, T1) = e(g1, g2)
αβ·det(B)
D2 = e(C2, T2) = e(g1, g2)
αβγ·~xB(B∗)T ~fT = e(g1, g2)αβ·det(B)γ〈~x,
~f〉 since B ·B∗ = det(B) · I
D01 = D2 holds if and only if γ〈~x, ~f〉 = 0. Due to the fact that γ is chosen uniformly
random, γ〈~x, ~f〉 holds if and only if 〈~x, ~f〉 = 0 with overwhelming probability.
Security. With the same proof strategy as in [19], the above IPPE scheme can be proved
SIM-secure in the generic group model.
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IKK Attack 
 
Algorithm: Optimizer 
Require:  V: variable List 
  D: domain List 
  K: known assignments 
  Mp, Mc: pair similarity matrices 
 
valList  copy D 
for all cipher vari ∈ V do 
        vali  select random member of valList 
        add {vari = vali} to initState 
        remove vali from valList 
end for 
add K to initState 
return ANNEAL (initState, D, Mp, Mc) 
 
 
 
Algorithm: ANNEAL 
Require: initState, D, Mp, Mc 
  initTempareture, coolingRate, rejectThreshold 
 
currentState  initState 
succReject  0 
curt  initTempareture 
while (temp ≠ 0 and succReject < rejectThreshold ) do 
        currentCost  0, nextCost  0 
        nextState  copy currentState 
        (x, y)  select random pair from nextState  
        y’  select random member of D different from y  
        remove {x = y} from nextState  
        add {x = y’} to nextState  
        if (z, y’) is a member of currentState then 
 remove { z = y’ } from nextState 
 add { z = y } to nextState 
        end if  
        for all cells i, j in Mc 
 (i, k)  currentState.get(i), (i, k’)  nextState.get(i) 
 (j, l )  currentState.get(j), (j, l’ )  nextState.get(j) 
 currentCost += (Mc[i, j] – Mp[k. l])2 
 nextCost += (Mc[i, j] – Mp[k’, l’])2 
        end for 
        E = nextCost – currentCost 
        if (E < 0) then  
 Accept new state 
        else  
 Accept new state with probability exp(-E / currT) 
        end if 
        if new state is accepted then 
  succRehect  0, currentState  nextState 
        else  
 succReject ++ 
        end if 
        currT = coolingRate * currT 
end while 
return currentState  
 
 
 
Modified IKK Attack 
 
Algorithm: Modified_Optimizer 
Require:  V: variable List 
  D: domain List 
  K: known assignments 
  Mp, Mc: pair similarity matrices 
 
valList  copy D 
for all cipher vari ∈ V do 
        vali  select random member of valList 
        add {vari = vali} to initState 
        #remove vali from valList 
end for 
add K to initState 
return Modified_ANNEAL (initState, D, Mp, Mc) 
 
 
 
Algorithm: Modified_ANNEAL 
Require: initState, D, Mp, Mc 
  initTempareture, coolingRate, rejectThreshold 
 
currentState  initState 
succReject  0 
curt  initTempareture 
while (temp ≠ 0 and succReject < rejectThreshold ) do 
        currentCost  0, nextCost  0 
        nextState  copy currentState 
        (x, y)  select random pair from nextState  
        y’  select random member of D different from y  
        remove {x = y} from nextState  
        add {x = y’} to nextState  
        #if (z, y’) is a member of currentState then 
        # remove { z = y’ } from nextState 
        # add { z = y } to nextState 
        #end if  
        for all cells i, j in Mc 
 (i, k)  currentState.get(i), (i, k’)  nextState.get(i) 
 (j, l )  currentState.get(j), (j, l’ )  nextState.get(j) 
 currentCost += (Mc[i, j] – Mp[k. l])2 
 nextCost += (Mc[i, j] – Mp[k’, l’])2 
        end for 
        E = nextCost – currentCost 
        if (E < 0) then  
 Accept new state 
        else  
 Accept new state with probability exp(-E / currT) 
        end if 
        if new state is accepted then 
  succRehect  0, currentState  nextState 
        else  
 succReject ++ 
        end if 
        currT = coolingRate * currT 
end while 
return currentState  
 
 
B.2 IKK Attack and Modified IKK Attack
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